Not My Problem? Landlord Liability for Tenant-on-Tenant Harassment by Short, Aric
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
4-2021 
Not My Problem? Landlord Liability for Tenant-on-Tenant 
Harassment 
Aric Short 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 




Not My Problem? Landlord Liability for Tenant-
on-Tenant Harassment 
ARIC SHORT† 
Tenant-on-tenant harassment because of a victim’s race, gender, or other protected status, is a 
severe and increasingly widespread problem often targeting vulnerable tenants. The creation of 
a hostile housing environment violates the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), and victims may 
recover from their abusers, whether they are landlords or fellow tenants. But plaintiffs in two 
recent FHA lawsuits sought recovery from their landlords for something different: their 
landlords’ failure to intervene in and stop harassment committed by other tenants. These suits 
raise novel and important questions about the scope of the FHA, but the two courts disagreed 
about how the FHA’s language should be interpreted. This Article demonstrates why the FHA 
should be interpreted to impose on landlords a duty to take reasonable steps to investigate and 
remedy tenant-on-tenant harassment that they know or should have known about. 
In the workplace, under Title VII, employers have a duty, flowing from statutory language nearly 
identical to the FHA, to take reasonable steps to prevent hostile work environments. Despite 
strong similarities between the FHA and Title VII in language and congressional intent, courts 
have been reluctant to import a parallel standard in the housing setting. This Article analyzes the 
Title VII analogy and illustrates that compelling reasons exist for courts to fully adopt the Title 
VII analogy in this emerging area of FHA law. 
  
 
 † Professor of Law and Director, Professionalism and Leadership Program, Texas A&M University 
School of Law. J.D., The University of Texas School of Law; A.B., Georgetown University. I am grateful for 
helpful comments on ideas expressed in this Article from Robert G. Schwemm, Michael Z. Green, and Tanya J. 
Pierce. 
1228 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1227 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1229 
I.      DEVELOPING FHA PROTECTION AGAINST POST-ACQUISITION  
HARASSMENT ..................................................................................... 1234 
II.     ANALYZING FHA LIABILITY FOR LANDLORDS IN CASES OF  
TENANT-ON-TENANT HARASSMENT .................................................. 1237 
A. WETZEL V. GLEN ST. ANDREW LIVING COMMUNITY, LLC ............ 1237 
1. District Court Opinion in Wetzel ........................................ 1238 
2. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Wetzel ........................ 1239 
B. FRANCIS V. KINGS PARK MANOR, INC. ......................................... 1242 
1. District Court Decision in Francis ....................................... 1242 
2. Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Francis ........................ 1244 
a. Francis I ......................................................................... 1245 
b. Francis II ........................................................................ 1250 
c. HUD Regulations ........................................................... 1252 
III.    EXPLORING THE ANALOGY TO TITLE VII ............................................. 1256 
A. TITLE VII’S PROHIBITION ON HARASSMENT OF EMPLOYEES ..... 1258 
B. AGENCY IS MISSING IN THE LANDLORD-TENANT  
RELATIONSHIP ............................................................................ 1259 
1. Harassment by Non-Supervisors ......................................... 1262 
2. Relevance to the Housing Setting ........................................ 1265 
C. LANDLORD LACKS SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER  
HARASSING TENANTS ................................................................ 1266 
D. PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS ................................................ 1271 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1273 
  
April 2021] TENANT-ON-TENANT HARASSMENT 1229 
INTRODUCTION 
In June of 2015, Marsha Wetzel, who was sixty-eight years old, disabled, 
and lesbian, navigated her electric scooter up a ramp at her apartment complex.1 
As another tenant passed her, he muttered a homophobic slur and rammed into 
Wetzel’s scooter hard enough to tip it off the ramp, injuring her.2 That incident 
was part of what one federal court described as a “torrent of physical and verbal 
abuse”3 perpetrated by residents who targeted Wetzel because of her sexuality. 
They spit on Wetzel, taunted her about her recently deceased partner, called her 
vulgar and derogatory names, and threatened to “rip [her] tits off.”4 Tormented 
by the ongoing harassment, Wetzel notified staff at the apartment complex, 
appealing to them for help.5 The abusive behavior by other tenants against 
Wetzel continued, however.6 It became so severe that she retreated into her 
apartment, stopped visiting the common areas of the complex, and became 
increasingly anxious, afraid, and isolated.7 Wetzel eventually filed suit under the 
federal Fair Housing Act (FHA).8 
Wetzel’s FHA claims against the tenants who harassed her have a strong 
foundation in the FHA, although they are not completely uncontroversial.9 All 
federal circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FHA has 
some post-acquisition reach, extending its protections to residents after the sale 
or rental of housing.10 While a few federal courts appear inclined to limit that 
reach to prohibited conduct triggering constructive eviction,11 most courts have 
 
 1. The facts in the Introduction are drawn from the complaint filed on July 27, 2016, in Wetzel v. Glen St. 
Andrew Living Community, LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 
Complaint at 7, Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 16 C 7598) 
[hereinafter Wetzel Complaint]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 859. 
 4. Wetzel Complaint, supra note 1, at 16 (alteration in original).  
 5. Id. at 10–11.   
 6. Id. at 16–17.   
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 3. 
 9. As described more fully below, some federal courts continue to question the extent to which the FHA 
regulates conduct after the sale or rental of housing. See infra Part I. 
 10. See, e.g., Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. City of LaGrange, 940 F.3d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(concluding that the FHA “may, under certain circumstances, encompass the claim of a current owner or renter 
for discriminatory conduct”); Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the FHA is 
not limited to claims of denial of housing but may reach instances of constructive eviction); Comm. Concerning 
Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the FHA reaches 
post-acquisition claims including those involving discrimination in the enjoyment of a dwelling); Woodard v. 
Fanboy, L.L.C., 298 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the FHA supports a claim for housing 
discrimination where the plaintiff alleged sex-based discrimination following the landlord’s eviction of her after 
she refused his sexual advances); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 985–86 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(recognizing that the FHA encompasses claims for unlawful eviction based on race). 
 11. See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 
2004) (noting that although the FHA “might be stretched far enough” to encompass conduct that constitutes 
constructive eviction, the statute “contains no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a concern 
with anything but access to housing”); Cox, 430 F.3d at 746 (concluding that a city’s alleged discriminatory 
enforcement of zoning laws was not sufficiently connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling to support a FHA 
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adopted a broader perspective, recognizing a FHA claim when a “hostile housing 
environment” is created by intentionally discriminatory conduct.12 In the process 
of interpreting the language of the FHA, these courts routinely refer to analogous 
statutory language in the employment setting under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII).13 Largely importing the Title VII hostile environment 
test into this FHA context, courts addressing claims of housing harassment have 
required proof that the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome harassment as a 
result of her membership in a protected class and that the harassment was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s living conditions and 
create an abusive environment.14 If Wetzel’s allegations are true, the harassment 
she endured was based on her sex,15 and it created a severely and pervasively 
abusive living environment. As a result, Wetzel’s claims against the harassing 
residents appear strong. 
Beyond this more traditional hostile housing environment context, 
Wetzel’s lawsuit raises an additional FHA claim that has begun to perplex both 
federal courts and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) and will undoubtedly be the subject of future litigation: Does the FHA 
require housing providers, including landlords, to intervene and stop unlawful 
tenant-on-tenant harassment? The resolution of this question will have broad and 
profound implications. An affirmative answer may expose landlords and other 
housing providers to vastly greater liability under the FHA than has previously 
been recognized and create confusion about whether they must implement 
systems to monitor and investigate potential harassment by tenants.16 However, 
by imposing on landlords the responsibility to intervene in cases of tenant-on-
 
claim); Francis II, 944 F.3d 370, 388 (2d Cir. 2019) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (arguing that the only post-
acquisition privilege recognized by every federal circuit to have considered it is continued occupancy), reh’g 
granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 12. See, e.g., Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 494–95 (D. Md. 1996); DiCenso v. 
Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1995); 
Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2018). Numerous cases have analogized to Title VII in the FHA 
context. See, e.g., Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 495 (noting as the first reason that courts have recognized claims 
for hostile housing environment under the FHA that “sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII in the 
employment context”); DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008 (noting that various courts that have recognized harassment as 
an actionable form of discrimination under the FHA “have incorporated Title VII doctrines into their analyses”); 
Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090 (analyzing Title VII case law to support a reading of the FHA to encompass claims of 
sexual harassment that did not include constructive eviction). 
 14. See, e.g., Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090 (importing elements of a hostile workplace claim under Title VII into 
a hostile housing environment claim under the FHA); see also DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008. 
 15. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that the 
defendant agreed with the court’s ruling in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc), holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is sex discrimination under 
Title VII, and that conclusion applies with equal force in the fair housing context).  
 16. In response to its proposed rulemaking in this area, HUD received a number of comments expressing 
concern and confusion about the potential of holding landlords liable for tenant-on-tenant harassment. See Quid 
Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the 
Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,064–67 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
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tenant harassment, the FHA might become a more effective and efficient tool 
for systematically ending post-acquisition harassment.  
And harassment in the housing setting is a real and growing problem17—
one that an assistant secretary for HUD recently described as “pervasive.”18 
Sexual, racial, disability, and other types of harassment usually target vulnerable 
tenants with the highest degree of housing insecurity19 and, as a result, go 
unreported more than other types of FHA violations.20 Although there is very 
little hard data,21 available information indicates that this problem is getting 
worse. For example, the National Fair Housing Alliance, which aggregates 
reports of housing discrimination annually, reports that cases of housing 
harassment have “increase[ed] at a rapid rate in the past few years.”22 There were 
897 reported incidents of harassment in 2018, up significantly from 747 in 2017 
and 640 in 2016.23 And a recent limited pilot study focusing on the problem of 
sexual harassment in Missouri housing found that sixteen percent of low-income 
women reported some form of sexual harassment in the housing setting.24 
 
 17. Scholarly and popular attention on this topic has focused primarily on the problem of landlord 
harassment of tenants or whether the FHA protects against post-acquisition harassment at all. See, e.g., Jill 
Maxwell, Sexual Harassment at Home: Altering the Terms, Conditions and Privileges of Rental Housing for 
Section 8 Recipients, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 223 (2006); Rigel C. Oliveri, Sexual Harassment of Low-Income 
Women in Housing: Pilot Study Results, 83 MO. L. REV. 597 (2018) [hereinafter Oliveri, Sexual Harassment of 
Low-Income Women]; Christina Colón, When Your Sexual Harasser Has Keys to Your Apartment, SOJOURNERS 
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://sojo.net/articles/when-your-sexual-harasser-has-keys-your-apartment; see also Robert 
G. Schwemm, Neighbor-on-Neighbor Harassment: Does the Fair Housing Act Make a Federal Case Out of It?, 
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (2011); Mary Pennisi, A Herculean Leap for the Hard Case of Post-Acquisition 
Claims: Interpreting Fair Housing Act Section 3604(b) After Modesto, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1083 (2010); 
Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2008); Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717 (2008); Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the 
Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203 (2006). One author has addressed whether the FHA should 
be interpreted as extending landlord liability for “co-tenant harassment.” See Cassia Pangas, Making the Home 
More Like a Castle: Why Landlords Should be Held Liable for Co-Tenant Harassment, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 561 
(2011). This comment predated the Wetzel and Francis litigation, as well as HUD’s rulemaking on landlord 
liability for third-party harassment. 
 18. Candace Smith & Katie Muldowney, Uncovering Rampant Sexual Harassment in Housing Systems: 
“That’s Where You’re Supposed to be Safest . . . Your Home”, ABC NEWS (Feb. 25, 2019, 6:16 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/uncovering-rampant-sexual-harassment-housing-systems-supposed-safest/ 
story?id=61307137 (quoting Amy Thompson, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at HUD). 
 19. NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., MAKING EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD A PLACE OF OPPORTUNITY: 2018 FAIR 
HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 54 (2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/NFHA-2018-
Fair-Housing-Trends-Report_4-30-18.pdf [hereinafter 2018 TRENDS REPORT]. Victims with housing insecurity 
may be unlikely to report incidents of harassment for fear of being evicted. See id.; see also Smith & Muldowney, 
supra note 18 (“Most experts agree that women of color [and] single women . . . are the most vulnerable.”). 
 20. 2018 TRENDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 54. 
 21. No national study exists measuring the overall incidents of harassment in the setting of housing, 
resulting in few hard statistics. See Smith & Muldowney, supra note 18. 
 22. 2018 TRENDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 54. 
 23. NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., DEFENDING AGAINST UNPRECEDENTED ATTACKS ON FAIR HOUSING: 2019 
FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 18 (2019), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-
Trends-Report.pdf. 
 24. Oliveri, Sexual Harassment of Low-Income Women, supra note 17, at 615. The U.S. Department of 
Justice also announced in 2017 the creation of the Sexual Harassment in Housing Initiative, which was designed 
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Despite the importance of this subject, the related law is a confusing tangle 
that includes opaque statutory language, conflicting federal opinions, a HUD 
regulation that has been largely ignored by federal courts, and persistent, though 
inconsistent, analogies to Title VII. Although the FHA contains general and 
sweeping language, backed by broad congressional intent to eradicate housing 
discrimination, its text is silent on whether landlords have an obligation to stop 
tenant-on-tenant harassment. As a result, courts have struggled to make sense of 
the FHA’s scope in two recent lawsuits,25 taking dramatically different 
approaches and yielding conflicting results. Far from clarifying the law in this 
area and establishing predictable standards, these decisions have created 
significant uncertainty.  
At the center of these decisions, however, are recurring references to the 
employment setting, in which employers are obligated under Title VII to 
investigate and attempt remediation of hostile work environments created by 
employees.26 Although these courts have referenced the Title VII setting and 
analogized generally to the workplace environment, they have curiously stopped 
short of fully adopting the Title VII analogy. One recent court hesitated to rely 
on such an analogy because of “salient differences between Title VII and the 
FHA” that would need to be overcome first, though the court failed to identify 
what those differences might be.27  
Even HUD, in its 2016 regulation directly addressing landlord liability for 
tenant-on-tenant harassment, took an unusual approach to Title VII. That rule, 
unlike the general language of the FHA, itself, clearly articulates liability where 
a housing provider fails to “take prompt action to correct and end a 
discriminatory housing practice by a third-party, where the person knew or 
should have known” of the conduct and “had the power to correct it.”28 In 
explaining its rule, HUD referred repeatedly to parallel statutory language in 
Title VII that has been interpreted by courts as imposing on employers the duty 
to end employee-on-employee harassment.29 However, although HUD’s 
regulation has been seen by federal courts as “mirror[ing] the scope of employer 
 
to coordinate federal and state resources to help facilitate and encourage reports of harassing behavior. See 
Sexual Harassment in Housing Initiative, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
sexual-harassment-housing-initiative. 
 25. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, No. 16 C 7598, 2017 WL 201376, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
18, 2017), rev'd and remanded, 901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018); Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 
420 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 917 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 
(2d Cir.), and superseded, 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. 
Mar. 25, 2021), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), and vacated, No. 15-
1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021), and aff’d, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. 
Mar. 25, 2021). 
 26. See, e.g., Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 863; Francis, 917 F.3d at 117–18, 119–25. 
 27. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 866. 
 28. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,056, 63,074 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 100). 
 29. See infra Part II.B.2.c.  
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liability . . . for employee-on-employee harassment,”30 the agency noted in its 
rulemaking that significant differences between workplace and housing 
harassment required a unique housing-related rule.31 
Title VII, which has consistently been used by courts and HUD as a 
reference point in interpreting the FHA, is thus centrally important in delineating 
the scope of the statute in this new context. Both statutes were drafted with 
similar relevant language,32 both were part of a larger civil rights agenda,33 and 
both were intended to be broadly applied and have wide-ranging remedial 
effects.34 In many other contexts, courts have relied on the Title VII analogy in 
recognizing parallel rights under the FHA when the statute’s language allows 
it.35 But there are clearly limits to the analogy, and courts have shied away from 
reflexive importation of Title VII standards into FHA jurisprudence.36 They 
have also explicitly rejected such importation when justified by policy.37 As 
 
 30. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 866.  
 31. See, e.g., Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing 
Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,054. 
 32. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2018) (prohibiting “discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 
therewith”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin”). 
 33. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.), aff’d in 
part 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam) (describing the “persuasive . . . parallel between Title VII and [the FHA]” 
making the two statutes “part of a coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination”). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 985 F.2d 1451, 1456 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(“Employment law concepts and rules frequently find application in fair housing cases.”); Huntington Branch, 
N.A.A.C.P., 844 F.2d at 934 (stating that the Second Circuit has “pointedly accepted the relevance of Title VII 
cases to Title VIII cases”); Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Md. 1996) (noting given 
the “similar aims” of Title VII and Title VIII, the Fourth Circuit “has been willing to import doctrines or 
interpretations of language accepted under Title VII to Title VIII claims”); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 
Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Courts have recognized that Title VIII is the functional equivalent of 
Title VII, and so the provisions of these two statutes are given like construction and application.” (citations 
omitted)); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that because the Tenth Circuit, at that 
time, had not addressed sexual discrimination under the FHA, the court would “look to employment 
discrimination cases for guidance”); see also Short, supra note 17, at 240 (citing to cases using the Title VII 
analogy in FHA litigation involving “whether to recognize discriminatory effects, how to approach mixed motive 
cases, and when burden shifting should be implemented in the process of evaluating discriminatory intent” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 36. See Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2018). The Seventh 
Circuit in Wetzel “refrain[ed] from reflexively adopting the Title VII standard” and looked to other legal settings 
and relationships for guidance. Id. 
 37. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 917 F.3d 109, 135 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (citing Curtis 
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974), where the Court “reject[ed] reasoning by analogy to Title VII in 
interpreting [the FHA]”), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), 
reh'g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 
2021). 
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discussed, employer liability for employee-on-employee harassment is well-
established under Title VII law.38  
This Article argues that the Title VII analogy should be fully embraced by 
federal courts addressing claims of tenant-on-tenant harassment under the FHA. 
As a result, landlords should be held to a general negligence standard: they must 
act reasonably in investigating and seeking to remediate the creation of a hostile 
housing environment by their tenants. This rule would track the employer 
liability standard under Title VII in the parallel hostile workplace context. Part 
I gives context for the overall discussion by providing the framework of FHA 
protection against post-acquisition harassment, including the development of 
hostile housing environment law. Part II explores current federal law related to 
landlord liability for tenant-on-tenant harassment, including recent federal 
litigation and HUD’s 2016 rulemaking. Finally, Part III turns explicitly to the 
Title VII analogy and analyzes concerns that have been raised about its adoption 
in this new area of FHA law. In particular, this Part addresses concepts of agency 
and control that have figured prominently in workplace harassment decisions. 
Ultimately, the Article concludes that no reasonable argument exists to reject the 
Title VII analogy. And adopting it will lead to greater protection for vulnerable 
tenants without imposing an unfair burden on landlords.  
I.  DEVELOPING FHA PROTECTION AGAINST POST-ACQUISITION 
HARASSMENT 
In force since 1968, the FHA prohibits discrimination in public and private 
housing because of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national 
origin, or handicap status.39 Its broad language explicitly prohibits 
discriminatory refusals to rent or sell,40 as well as discriminatory differences in 
the terms and conditions of housing.41 The FHA also bans ads and notices that 
discriminate,42 as well as threats and coercion targeting individuals exercising 
their fair housing rights.43  
Although the FHA prohibits a wide range of discriminatory housing-
related practices, two of its provisions have been relied on to support claims of 
harassment in the context of housing. Section 3604(b) prohibits 
“discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in 
connection therewith.”44 And § 3617 states that it is unlawful to “coerce, 
 
 38. See infra Part III.B (collecting cases involving employer liability under Title VII in cases in which 
employees were harassed by supervisory employees, non-supervisory employees, customers, patients, 
independent contractors, and anonymous parties); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2020). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2018). 
 40. Id. § 3604(a). 
 41. Id. § 3604(b). 
 42. Id. § 3604(c). 
 43. Id. § 3617. 
 44. Id. § 3604(b). 
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intimidate, threaten, or interfere” with anyone in their exercise or enjoyment of 
their fair housing rights.45 Neither provision specifies whom a proper defendant 
might be in any FHA action. 
Harassment based on any protected status may violate the FHA,46 but sex-
based harassment has been a recurring topic of FHA litigation.47 Sex was added 
to the FHA as a protected class through amendments to the Act in 1974.48 As a 
result, any refusal to sell or rent, any difference in the terms and conditions of 
housing, or the services provided with housing, and any threat or coercion 
associated with the exercise of housing rights as a result of a person’s sex is 
prohibited.49 Beyond traditional FHA claims now extended to sex, the addition 
of this protected class also ushered in new FHA claims, including suits by 
victims of domestic abuse.50 While sex-related suits under the FHA remain 
relatively rare, many of those cases involve claims of sexual harassment.51  
In 1983, Shellhammer v. Lewallen was the first reported decision in the 
housing context involving claims of sexual harassment.52 The plaintiffs, a 
married couple, alleged that their landlord violated the FHA by evicting them 
because Ms. Shellhammer declined his requests to pose nude and have sex with 
 
 45. Id. § 3617. This provision specifically references back to §§ 3603–3606, raising the textual question of 
whether a harassment claim under § 3617 must also allege a violation of one of the other referenced provisions 
of the FHA. Of course, if § 3617 is not viable without an actual violation of §§ 3603–3606, it is rendered 
meaningless. Instead, a plaintiff alleging a § 3617 violation must plead facts showing that the defendant’s alleged 
conduct related to the exercise or enjoyment of a right protected by §§ 3603–3606. See Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 
F.3d 771, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding that “[c]oercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with or on 
account of a person’s exercise of his or her §§ 3603–3606 rights can be distinct from outright violations of 
§§ 3603–3606,” and any other interpretation of § 3617 would give it “no independent meaning”).  
 46. See, e.g., Hous. Rts. Ctr. v. Sterling, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1192–93 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (race); Texas v. 
Crest Asset Mgmt., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730–33 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (national origin); Neudecker v. Boisclair 
Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003) (disability); Bloch, 587 F.3d at 781 (religion). 
 47. See, e.g., Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 495–96 (D. Md. 1996) (collecting cases 
and concluding that claims for sexual harassment make out an actionable claim for hostile housing environment 
under the FHA); see also United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 971–78 (D. Neb. 2004); DiCenso v. 
Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a claim for hostile housing environment under the 
FHA based on sex-based discrimination); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088–90 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding 
that claims for hostile housing environment are actionable under the FHA). 
 48. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b), 88 Stat. 633, 729 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606, 3613, 3617). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617. 
 50. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zanesville Metro. Hous. Auth., 975 F. Supp. 2d 863, 872 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(concluding that a management company “was aware, or should have been aware, that Plaintiff was the victim 
of longstanding and continuing domestic violence,” which could give rise to an inference that the defendant 
“acted with intent to discriminate on the basis of gender”); Creason v. Singh, No. 13-cv-03731-JST, 2013 WL 
6185596, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013) (finding that “the eviction of a tenant because she is a victim of 
domestic violence might constitute unlawful [sex] discrimination” under the FHA), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 462 (9th 
Cir. 2016). 
 51. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 11C:1 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 2020) (reporting 
that sex-based claims make up approximately ten percent of the administrative complaints brought under the 
FHA).  
 52.  Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 1 Fair Hous.-Fair Lending Rep. (PH) ¶ 15,472 (W.D. Ohio 1983), aff’d, 
770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual 
Harassment Under the Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 781. 
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him.53 Because no fair housing case law existed in this area, the magistrate relied 
on similarly worded law in the Title VII employment setting.54 At the time, Title 
VII sexual harassment law was more developed and recognized quid pro quo 
and hostile environment claims.55 While the magistrate ruled that the plaintiffs 
had suffered quid pro quo housing discrimination because they had been evicted 
after refusing to submit to their landlord’s sexual demands, he concluded that 
the plaintiffs had not shown the existence of a hostile housing environment.56 
Using standards developed in the Title VII context, the magistrate determined 
that the landlord’s two specific requests for nude photos and sex “[did] not 
amount to the pervasive and persistent conduct which is a predicate” to finding 
that the sexual harassment unduly burdened the Shellhammers’ tenancy.57  
Courts following Shellhammer continued to recognize sexual harassment 
claims under the FHA, given the statute’s prohibition of discrimination based on 
gender.58 In doing so, they noted that a framework to analyze such claims did 
not exist in the FHA and turned to Title VII law not just for general guidance, 
but for specific elements of a parallel FHA claim. Courts have justified this 
approach because of strong similarities in the language and purpose of the two 
statutes.59 In the context of quid pro quo harassment, the Eighth Circuit in 2010 
specifically imported Title VII elements into its FHA analysis: (1) the plaintiff 
must be a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff must be subject to 
unwelcome harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual 
favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and (4) their submission to the 
unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job 
benefits or the refusal to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment.60 In the 
housing context, courts have found claims for quid pro quo discrimination to 
exist where, for example, the landlord raised the rent and threatened eviction 
when a tenant failed to acquiesce to his demands for sex.61 
In the second type of sexual harassment case—hostile environment—
federal courts have also relied heavily on Title VII law in crafting the 
 
 53. Shellhammer, 770 F.2d 167 at *1. 
 54. Id. at *1–2.  
 55. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 52, at 777 (noting that cases recognizing Title VII harassment liability 
date to at least 1971, and that by 1986 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that hostile workplace claims were 
actionable under Title VII, “a good deal of Title VII law on this subject had already been written”). 
 56. Shellhammer, 770 F.2d 167 at *2–3. 
 57. Id. at *2. 
 58. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 
(7th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 495–96 (D. Md. 1996) (listing cases 
supporting its conclusion that the FHA prohibits the creation of a hostile housing environment). To trigger 
violation of the FHA, the alleged acts “need not be purely sexual; it is sufficient that they would not have 
happened but for claimant’s gender.” See Honce, 1 F.3d at 1090. 
 59. Short, supra note 17, at 241. 
 60. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 
1006 n.8 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Title VII law to a claim of sexual harassment in the workplace)). 
 61. See, e.g., Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 
2005). 
April 2021] TENANT-ON-TENANT HARASSMENT 1237 
requirements for a similar claim under the FHA, usually tracking Title VII’s 
requirements nearly verbatim. To prove a case of hostile housing environment, 
a FHA plaintiff must show they (1) suffered unwelcome harassment based on a 
protected characteristic; (2) the harassment was so severe and pervasive that it 
interfered with the terms, conditions, or privileges of their residency, or in the 
provision of services or facilities; and (3) there is a probability of imputing 
liability to the defendant.62  
Although the importation of Title VII policy and legal standards into FHA 
jurisprudence has been questioned at times by both courts and scholars,63 it has 
continued up to the present time. In the most recent question to arise about the 
scope of the FHA—whether the statute requires landlords to intervene in and 
stop harassment committed by one tenant against another—Title VII again plays 
a prominent role. Two recent lawsuits addressing this question have raised the 
relevance of Title VII, as well as a related regulation promulgated by HUD that 
has been described by one federal court as “mirror[ing] the scope of employee 
liability under Title VII for employee-on-employee harassment.”64 And yet, 
there is clear reluctance in both the courts and at HUD to rely heavily on the 
Title VII analogy in this new context. Before turning to a more focused analysis 
of the justification and wisdom of drawing heavily on Title VII in this new 
terrain of the FHA, a review of recent law in this area provides a useful context.  
II.  ANALYZING FHA LIABILITY FOR LANDLORDS IN CASES OF TENANT-
ON-TENANT HARASSMENT  
A. WETZEL V. GLEN ST. ANDREW LIVING COMMUNITY, LLC 
As described in the Introduction, Marsha Wetzel was subjected to vulgar, 
hateful, and discriminatory harassment based on her sexuality while she was a 
tenant at the Glen St. Andrew Living Community (GSALC).65 Her fellow 
tenants called her derogatory terms, such as “fucking dyke” and “homosexual 
bitch.”66 Wetzel was also told that “homosexuals will burn in hell”67 and that her 
recently deceased partner “died to get away from [Wetzel].”68 On one occasion, 
another tenant rammed into the table Wetzel was eating at, causing the table to 
 
 62. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 63. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974) (rejecting Title VII analogy in the context of 
interpreting the FHA); Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit 
Application of Title VII Employment Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW & INEQ. 351 (2000); Alyssa 
George, Note, The Blind Spots of Law and Culture: How the Workplace Paradigm of Sexual Harassment 
Marginalizes Sexual Harassment in the Home, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 645 (2016). 
 64. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 866. 
 65. Wetzel Complaint, supra note 1, at 6–19; Wetzel, 901 F.3d 856 at 859. 
 66. Wetzel Complaint, supra note 1, at 6. 
 67. Id. at 8. 
 68. Id. at 13. 
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topple onto her.69 Wetzel was also assaulted when an unidentified intruder struck 
her on the back of the head and fled the room saying, “homo,” as he left.70 
Wetzel complained about the abuse to GSALC staff, and the tenants’ 
behavior improved temporarily.71 But when the harassment resumed and Wetzel 
notified staff once again, she was met with apathy first, and then retaliation. 
GSALC failed to investigate Wetzel’s claims,72 called her a liar,73 and then 
began to blame her for the deteriorating relationship with fellow tenants.74 
Management then barred Wetzel from spending time in the GSALC lobby75 and 
terminated all room cleaning for her.76 Staff also moved Wetzel’s seat in the 
dining room to a less desirable location.77 In a perceived attempt to force her out 
of the GSALC, management also falsely accused Wetzel on multiple occasions 
of violating an anti-smoking rule and even slapped her during one confrontation 
about the rule.78  
1. District Court Opinion in Wetzel 
Wetzel filed suit against the GSALC and individual employees under an 
Illinois civil rights act, as well as § 3604 and § 3617 of the FHA.79 At the heart 
of her complaint was the claim that GSALC staff and management violated the 
FHA by failing to take effective steps to end the discriminatory harassment that 
Wetzel endured at the hands of fellow residents.80 The defendants moved to 
dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim.81  
Analyzing § 3617 first, the court articulated the Seventh Circuit’s 
requirement for a successful claim: Wetzel would have to prove that:  
(1) she [was] a protected person under the FHA, (2) she was engag[ing] in the 
exercise or enjoyment of her fair housing rights, (3) the defendants coerced, 
threatened, intimidated, or interfered with [her] on account of her protected 
activity under the FHA; and (4) the defendants were motivated by an intent to 
discriminate.82  
 
 69. Id. at 8. 
 70. Id. at 11. The defendants referred to these attacks as Wetzel’s “on-going squabbles with an older male 
resident and a couple of isolated incidents with two elderly female residents.” Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 
2, Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC, 901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1322).  
 71. Wetzel Complaint, supra note 1, at 7. 
 72. Id. at 9. 
 73. Id. at 8. 
 74. Id. at 9. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 11. 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. Id. at 14–15. 
 79. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, No. 16 C 7598, 2017 WL 201376, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
18, 2017), rev’d and remanded, 901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 80. Wetzel Complaint, supra note 1, at 18. In addition, by taking affirmative steps to punish her after she 
complained, Wetzel argued that the defendants violated the FHA by unlawfully retaliating against her. See id. at 
17. 
 81. Wetzel, 2017 WL 201376, at *1. 
 82. Id. (quoting Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
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In particular, the court emphasized the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that “a 
showing of intentional discrimination is an essential element of a § 3617 
claim.”83  
Her § 3604(b) claim fared no better. The court adopted a narrow view of 
post-acquisition § 3604(b) suits, concluding that they would be viable only in 
the context of constructive eviction.84 Because “it is well-understood that 
constructive eviction requires surrender of [the premises],” and because Wetzel 
continued to live at the GSALC during the abusive conduct and the filing of her 
lawsuit, she failed to state a claim under § 3604(b).85 More broadly, the court 
found no controlling precedent to support Wetzel’s argument that a landlord 
could face FHA liability for tenant-on-tenant harassment simply because the 
landlord was aware of that harassment and failed to take steps to end it.86 
2. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Wetzel 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit took a very different approach to Wetzel’s 
claims, framing the central issue as whether the defendants violated the FHA by 
“fail[ing] to ensure a non-discriminatory living environment” for her.87  
In addressing § 3604(b), the Seventh Circuit began by noting that FHA 
protections do not “evaporate once a person takes possession of her 
[dwelling].”88 The question, however, was whether the statute reached Wetzel’s 
particular post-acquisition claims. The court noted that § 3604(b)’s scope 
includes protection against a hostile housing environment—discriminatory 
harassment that unreasonably interferes with an occupant’s use and enjoyment 
of housing.89 Drawing from both FHA and Title VII case law, the court laid out 
the framework for a viable hostile housing environment claim: plaintiff must 
allege that  
(1) she endured unwelcome harassment based on a protected characteristic; 
(2) the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to interfere with the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of her residency, or in the provision of services or 
facilities; and (3) that there is a basis for imputing liability to the defendant.90  
The court quickly determined that Wetzel’s claims of sexual orientation-based 
discrimination constituted discrimination based on sex under both Title VII and 
the FHA, and that the frequency and nature of the harassment she endured was 
severe and pervasive. Then the court turned to what it described as, “the main 
 
 83. Id. (quoting East-Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also 
Kormoczy v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 53 F.3d 821, 823–24 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 84. Wetzel, 2017 WL 201376, at *2. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 88. Id. (citing Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 861–62 (first citing DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996); then citing Alamo 
v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017); and then citing Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
The court cited Honce v. Vigil for its use and adoption of Title VII hostile workplace elements in the FHA setting. 
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event”: whether there was a basis to impute liability to the defendants for the 
hostile housing environment.91 
The court began with the text of the FHA and recognized that although the 
statute prohibits sex-based discrimination, it is silent regarding who may be 
liable when sex-based discrimination occurs, or under what circumstances.92 
Given that silence, the court turned to Title VII for guidance, calling it an 
“analogous anti-discrimination statute[]” and noting that other courts had 
described the two statutes as “functional equivalent[s]” that should be “given 
like construction and application.”93 
The Seventh Circuit recognized that Title VII has a provision that mirrors 
§ 3604(b),94 making it unlawful in the employment setting “to discriminate 
against any individual . . . because of . . . sex.”95 That language has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court as imposing employer liability under Title VII 
when its negligence is a cause of the unlawful harassment.96 Because the FHA 
followed just four years after enactment of Title VII, and because the two 
statutes contain nearly identical language and have similar purposes, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that Congress must have intended that the relevant text in both 
statutes should have the same meaning.97 
Despite strong reasons to rely on Title VII to establish the contours of 
landlord liability for tenant-on-tenant harassment under § 3604(b) of the FHA, 
the Seventh Circuit stopped short of doing so. Instead, because of “potentially 
important differences between the relationship that exists between an employer 
and an employee, in which one is the agent of the other, and that between a 
landlord and a tenant, in which the tenant is largely independent of the landlord,” 
the court “refrain[ed] from reflexively adopting the Title VII standard” and 
looked to other legal settings and relationships for guidance.98 In particular, the 
court analogized the relationship between landlord and tenant to that of school 
district and student under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.99 
The court concluded that a school district would face Title IX liability by 
 
 91. Id. at 862.  
 92. Id. at 862–63. 
 93. Id. at 863 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 
289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000)) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 
519, 529–31 (2015)).  
 94. Id. (citing Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
 95. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018)). The full text of the provision in 
Title VII states that it shall be unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 96. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 863 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754–55 (1998)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 863–64; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018). 
April 2021] TENANT-ON-TENANT HARASSMENT 1241 
remaining “deliberately indifferent” to acts of student-on-student harassment if 
the harasser is within the school’s disciplinary authority.100 
Although the defendants in Wetzel argued that they should not be 
vicariously liable for harassment perpetrated by tenants, the Seventh Circuit 
made clear that their liability was direct, not vicarious.101 They could be liable 
because they had an “arsenal of incentives and sanctions” available to them to 
curb or stop the conduct of the harassing tenants, including suspension of access 
rights to common areas, threatening eviction, and actually evicting the offending 
tenants.102 
While the Seventh Circuit was comfortable relying heavily on Title VII to 
support its FHA interpretation, it declined to apply HUD’s recent rule that is 
directly on point.103 As discussed later, that rule recognized direct liability for a 
landlord who fails to take “prompt action to correct and end” unlawful 
harassment by a third party if the landlord “knew or should have known of the 
discriminatory conduct and had the power to correct it.”104 Although the court 
noted that the HUD rule “mirrors the scope of employee liability under Title VII 
for employee-on-employee harassment,” the court also recognized again that 
there are “salient differences between Title VII and the FHA.”105 While the 
Seventh Circuit did not conclude that those differences should result in different 
outcomes in the employment and housing settings, it indicated that further 
analysis was necessary before deciding that question.106 
The court’s decision to not base its decision on HUD’s rule may create 
greater uncertainty in this area of law. The HUD rule clearly assesses a 
landlord’s liability using a negligence test—whether the landlord knew or 
should have known of the discriminatory conduct—which is the standard used 
in Title VII law.107 The Seventh Circuit in Wetzel not only explicitly declined to 
adopt this standard, it apparently limited its holding to the case of actual 
knowledge on the part of the landlord: “[W]e have said only that the [landlord’s] 
duty not to discriminate in housing conditions encompasses the duty not to 
permit known harassment on protected grounds.”108 Whether the Seventh 
Circuit’s hesitation in adopting the HUD rule was associated with the difference 
between its negligence standard and actual knowledge is unclear. 
 
 100. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 864 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 646–47 (1999)). 
 101. Id. at 865 (making clear that the defendants’ liability, if any, “would be direct—the result of standing 
pat as Wetzel reported the barrage of harassment”). 
 102. Id. at 863. 
 103. Id. at 866. 
 104. Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii) (2020)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii). 
 108. Wetzel, 901 F.3d at 864. 
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B. FRANCIS V. KINGS PARK MANOR, INC. 
Approximately a year and a half after moving into his apartment, Donahue 
Francis, who is African-American, was targeted by a fellow resident, Raymond 
Endres, with a “continuous series of verbal assaults of violent threats and racial 
epithets that would persist for more than eight months.”109 Endres yelled insults 
at Francis, repeatedly calling him “fucking nigger” and “black bastard” and 
threatening him, “I oughta kill you.”110 Endres also engaged in strange and 
concerning behavior, including taking photographs into Francis’s house through 
his front door.111 As a result of these persistent and harassing interactions, 
Francis suffered humiliation, embarrassment, and both emotional and physical 
distress.112 
Francis contacted the owner and on-site housing manager of Kings Park, 
Inc., the residential complex where he lived, multiple times notifying them of 
the ongoing harassment and seeking their assistance in stopping it; each time he 
was ignored.113 The abuse was so severe that Francis called 911 four times.114 
Local police investigated the claims and first warned and then later arrested 
Endres for aggravated harassment.115 Endres pled guilty.116 Francis informed the 
defendants of Endres’s arrest and that his abusive behavior continued to interfere 
with Francis’s use and enjoyment of the property.117 The defendants, again, took 
no steps to stop the offensive conduct.118 In fact, when the property manager 
contacted the owners of Kings Park, Inc. regarding Endres’s abusive targeting 
of Francis, she was “told by the owners not to get involved.”119 
1. District Court Decision in Francis 
Francis then filed suit in federal court alleging violations of state and 
federal law, including § 3604(b) and § 3617 of the FHA, and the housing 
provider defendants filed a motion to dismiss.120 Judge Spatt granted that motion 
in part and denied in part.121 
 
 109. Complaint at 1, Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14-cv-
3555), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 917 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and 
superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 
2021), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), and aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 110. Id. at 4–7. 
 111. Id. at 9. 
 112. Id. at 14. 
 113. Id. at 6–10. 
 114. Id. at 5–8. 
 115. Id. at 8. 
 116. Id. at 10. 
 117. Id. at 8. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 9. 
 120. See Francis, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 425. A default judgment was entered against Endres. Id. at 438. 
 121. Id. at 438. 
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Although Judge Spatt labeled as “unclear” the extent to which the FHA 
prohibits post-acquisition discrimination, he recognized that Second Circuit 
courts have read § 3604(b) as prohibiting the creation of a hostile housing 
environment by persons with control or authority over a tenant’s terms or 
conditions of housing, “similar to the prohibition imposed by Title VII against 
the creation of a hostile work environment.”122 As Judge Spatt noted, “the FHA 
is often interpreted similarly to Title VII,” and Title VII cases are relevant to 
FHA disputes because Title VII and the FHA “are part of a coordinated scheme 
of federal civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination.”123 Recognizing that 
courts within the Second Circuit had found hostile housing environment claims 
viable under the FHA, the court drew directly from Title VII case law the 
framework necessary to establish a hostile housing environment claim,124 which 
is the same framework applied by the Seventh Circuit in Wetzel.125 
The main thrust of the court’s opinion focused on the third element: the 
circumstances under which one tenant’s harassing conduct can be imputed to the 
landlord.126 The court wrestled with the question of whether a landlord must 
have acted or failed to act because of discriminatory intent against the 
plaintiff.127 The court concluded that earlier cases had recognized such FHA 
claims “only where the landlord ‘created’ the conditions of harassment, rather 
than was merely notified about it and failed to take corrective action.”128 In the 
employment context, on the other hand, employers are liable for employee-on-
employee harassment when the employer “knew, or should have known, of the 
hostile work environment but failed to take appropriate remedial action.”129 The 
court found this critical distinction between Title VII and FHA case law as 
“presumably due to the well-known legal distinctions between the employer-
employee relationship and the landlord-tenant relationship.”130 
Turning back to the housing context, Judge Spatt noted that no Second 
Circuit court had opined on the question of whether a landlord could be liable 
under the FHA for not intervening in unlawful harassment between tenants.131 
Looking outside the Second Circuit, the court found case law on this point 
 
 122. Id. at 428 (quoting Cain v. Rambert, No. 13-CV-5807 MKB, 2014 WL 2440596, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 
30, 2014)). 
 123. Id. (quoting Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.), aff’d 
in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam)). 
 124. Id.  
 125. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 126. Francis, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 428. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 429. 
 129. Id. at 428 (quoting D’Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 281, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
 130. Id. at 429.  
 131. Id. 
1244 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1227 
“sparse”132 but distinguished case law relied on by Francis to support FHA 
liability in this case.133 
Finding nothing in federal case law to support Francis’s interpretation of 
FHA liability, Judge Spatt then turned to the text of § 3604 and § 3617. After 
ticking through typical fact patterns that have been found to violate the FHA, the 
court then concluded that, “[f]airly read,” the text of those provisions, supported 
by interpreting case law, “require[s] intentional discrimination on the part of a 
Defendant” to state a claim.134 Judge Spatt found “no compelling reason why 
that requisite showing is also not necessary for a ‘hostile housing environment’ 
claim,” assuming such claim is ever viable under the FHA.135 
2. Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Francis 
Francis’s appeal to the Second Circuit triggered two separate decisions and 
four opinions by the same three-judge panel in the span of nine months, 
contributing little clarity to this area of law.136 The first decision was issued by 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. The court distinguished Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003) on various 
grounds, including that the defendant’s children were alleged to have perpetrated some of the abuse. See id. at 
429. The court also distinguished Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Association, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1144 
(S.D. Fla. 2004) on the ground that it left open the possibility for a FHA claim against a homeowners association 
if its decision to not intervene in harassing conduct was based on discriminatory intent. See id. at 430–31. Finally, 
the court dealt with Fahnbulleh v. GFZ Realty, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 360, 364 (D. Md. 2011), in which the trial 
court denied a motion to dismiss a suit alleging that the landlord failed to intervene to stop tenant-on-tenant 
harassment. Judge Spatt did not find the Fahnbulleh court’s treatment of the FHA’s text sufficiently compelling. 
See id. at 431. 
 134. Id. at 433. 
 135. Id. 
 136. As this Article went to print, the Second Circuit issued a third decision in the Francis litigation: an en 
banc decision that vacated the prior panel decision and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint. 
Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. (Francis III), No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
Given the timing of Francis III, it cannot be thoroughly analyzed and incorporated into this Article. However, a 
few brief observations about the majority’s opinion are warranted. The court in Francis III largely embraced the 
reasoning of Justice Livingston’s dissents in the prior two decisions of the Second Circuit in this litigation, which 
are generally addressed in this Part. See id. at *2–3; supra notes 119–127 and accompanying text. In particular, 
the Francis III court’s emphasis on agency as a meaningfully distinguishing feature of the employer-harasser 
relationship, as compared to the landlord-harasser relationship is curious. Francis III, 2021 WL 1137441, at *11. 
As explained below, agency is not always the basis of employer liability in workplace harassment cases, most 
notably when the employer is liable for harassment perpetrated by customers, suppliers, or members of the 
public. See infra notes 137–140 and accompanying text. In those cases, courts have emphasized the obligation 
of employers to take reasonable steps to address the harassing conduct, regardless of the absence of agency. See 
infra notes 137–140 and accompanying text. The parallel question under the FHA, once discovery occurs, should 
be whether the landlord took reasonable steps to address the intentional tenant-on-tenant harassment. The details 
of a landlord’s control over the specific harasser should be one area to evaluate in the analysis at that point. This 
raises a related and concerning aspect of Francis III. There, the court dismisses plaintiff’s case on the pleadings, 
without providing any opportunity for fact development related to the reasonableness of the landlord’s response 
to the harassment, including the degree of control that the landlord had over the setting and the harasser. At the 
pleading stage, however, the “‘plaintiff cannot reasonably be required to allege more’ than minimal facts to 
support an inference of discriminatory intent.” Francis III, 2021 WL 1137441, at *17 (Lohier, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)). By dismissing the complaint despite 
plaintiff’s claims of intentional discrimination, the court appears to apply a “heightened pleading standard that 
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the Second Circuit on March 4, 2019 (Francis I).137 Judge Lohier wrote the 
majority opinion on behalf of Judge Pooler and himself, reversing the district 
court’s dismissal of Francis’s FHA claims;138 Judge Livingston wrote a detailed 
and spirited dissent.139 One month later, that decision and both opinions were 
withdrawn by the court without explanation.140 The Second Circuit then issued 
a new decision eight months later (Francis II)—also reversing the trial court’s 
dismissals—along with slightly revised opinions for the court by Judge Lohier 
and for Judge Livingston, in dissent.141 Because of the importance of those 
decisions and opinions in this evolving area of law, they are discussed below. 
a. Francis I 
The Second Circuit began with the question of whether § 3604(b) provides 
post-acquisition protections to tenants. Recognizing that the FHA is intended to 
have a “generous construction”142 consistent with its purpose to “eliminate all 
traces of discrimination within the housing field,”143 the court turned to the text 
of § 3604(b).144 As discussed earlier, all other circuits that have addressed this 
issue have concluded that § 3604(b) extends to at least constructive eviction,145 
and many circuits have read the provision more expansively.146 The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, has read “privileges” in § 3604(b) as implicating 
“continuing rights” and concluded that its “natural reading” covers claims 
“regarding services or facilities perceived to be wanting after the owner or tenant 
has acquired possession.”147 
In agreeing with its sister circuits’ broad interpretation of the FHA’s post-
acquisition scope, the Second Circuit explicitly drew parallels between 
§ 3604(b) and Title VII.148 Beyond recognizing that the FHA and Title VII are 
“part of . . . the coordinated congressional ‘scheme of federal civil rights laws 
 
is more demanding even than the evidentiary standard at summary judgment.” See id. at *18 (Lohier, J., 
dissenting). 
 137. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. (Francis I), 917 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d 
Cir.), and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, 
No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 138. Id. at 114. 
 139. Id. at 126 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 140. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 141. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc. (Francis II), 944 F.3d 370, 373 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 
F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 11374441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021).  
 142. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 117 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972)). 
 143. Id. (quoting Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 390 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 118. 
 146. See supra at 114–116 and accompanying notes. 
 147. Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 (9th Cir. 2009); Francis 
I, 917 F.3d at 117. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has interpreted the terms “privileges” and “conditions” as 
referring not just to the sale or rental, but to various privileges or benefits that flowed from acquisition. See 
Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 779–80 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 148. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 117–18. 
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enacted to end discrimination,’”149 the court focused on the fact that § 3604(b) 
has a nearly identical statutory counterpart in Title VII that prohibits 
discrimination with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.150 In the Title VII context, that language protects employees from 
employment-related discrimination that occurs both pre- and post-hiring.151 
While the Second Circuit described the analogy between Title VII and the FHA 
as “imperfect,” it also recognized that it would be “strange indeed if the nearly 
identical language of the FHA did not also impose liability for post-acquisition 
discrimination on landlords” in at least certain situations.152 That interpretation 
is consistent, the court recognized, with regulations promulgated by HUD that 
have been in place for over thirty years and prohibit various types of post-
acquisition conduct on the part of housing providers.153 Given the text of the 
FHA, the statute’s strong parallels to Title VII, and the existence of HUD 
regulations that have targeted post-acquisition discrimination for decades, the 
Second Circuit concluded that the statute reaches conduct that would interfere 
with enjoyment of a dwelling or in the provision of services associated with that 
dwelling after acquisition.154 
The Second Circuit then turned to the more significant question of 
“whether a landlord may ever be liable under the FHA for intentionally failing 
to address tenant-on-tenant” harassment.155 As a starting point, the court noted 
that in Wetzel—the only other circuit to address this issue—the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the FHA does create landlord liability in the case of actual notice 
of prohibited tenant-on-tenant harassment where the landlord fails to take 
reasonable steps in its control to stop the harassment.156 In addition, the Second 
Circuit relied on HUD’s 2016 regulation, which it accorded “‘great’ but by no 
means definitive” weight, which states, in part, that a landlord may face FHA 
liability for “[f]ailing to take prompt action to correct and end a discriminatory 
 
 149. Id. at 117 (quoting Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
 150. Id. at 118 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of” that employee’s membership in a protected class). Other courts have 
recognized the importance of the similarities in language between Title VII and § 3604(b). See, e.g., DiCenso v. 
Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a hostile housing environment claim and beginning 
its analysis “with the more familiar Title VII standard”); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088–90 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(citing Title VII decisions in concluding that a hostile environment claim could be actionable under the FHA). 
 151. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 118.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 152. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 118. 
 153. Id. at 119 (citing, among others, 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2), promulgated in 1989, which prohibits failing 
to undertake or delaying maintenance or repair of sale or rental dwellings because of race). See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 154. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 119. 
 155. Id. at 119–20. 
 156. Id. at 120 (citing Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2018)). 
The court endorsed this general approach, despite the fact that the FHA does not explicitly cover such liability, 
because statutory schemes rarely spell out every detail of the law’s reach. See id. The court pointed out, for 
example, that liability for constructive eviction or landlord-on-tenant harassment are also not explicitly set out 
in the FHA, but the statute has been construed as covering those scenarios. See id. 
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housing practice” by a tenant where the landlord “knew or should have known 
of the discriminatory conduct and had the power to correct it.”157 
Addressing concern that its approach would extend landlord liability to a 
wide range of common neighbor disputes,158 the court explained that liability 
would be imposed only in cases where harassment is so severe or pervasive that 
it interferes with the use and enjoyment of a dwelling.159 Furthermore, housing 
providers would be liable in such cases only if they knew or should have known 
about the misconduct and failed to intervene.160 As a result, liability in these 
cases would trigger a “fact-dependent inquiry” and would focus, to a large 
extent, on the landlord’s ability to control the specific third party undertaking 
the harassment.161 Having articulated that limitation, the court also noted that 
landlords usually have a range of tools available to them to limit or stop tenant-
on-tenant harassment, including issuing notices to quit, threatening eviction, and 
even actually evicting offending tenants.162 
Finally, the court addressed the defendants’ argument that even if a FHA 
claim were theoretically viable against them, Francis had failed to allege 
intentional discrimination by the defendants.163 The Second Circuit responded 
that it has never required discriminatory intent to make out a FHA violation; 
instead, proof of discriminatory effect could be sufficient.164 In this context, the 
court drew an explicit parallel to Title VII and hostile work environment 
claims.165 In the employment setting, the court noted that it has never required a 
showing of “direct intentional discrimination by the employer” to trigger 
liability.166 Instead, an employer’s liability has hinged on the employer’s “actual 
or constructive knowledge of the non-supervisory employee’s harassment and 
the employer’s subsequent failure to act.”167 Given the parallels between Title 
VII and the FHA, the court concluded that it would be error to require Francis, 
 
 157. Id. at 121 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii)). 
 158. The FHA was not intended “to become some all purpose civility code regulating conduct between 
neighbors.” Gourlay v. Forest Lake Ests. Civic Ass’n of Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1231 n.14 
(M.D. Fla. 2003); accord Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (cautioning that “every quarrel among neighbors in which a racial or religious slur is hurled [should 
not be turned] into a federal case”). 
 159. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 121. 
 160. Id. HUD’s regulations provide a further limiting concept: a landlord’s liability would extend only to 
the extent it can exercise control over the conduct of the third party. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii) (2020); 
infra notes 225–227 and accompanying text. 
 161. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 122. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 123–24. 
 164. Id. at 124 (first citing Davis v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64, 81 (2d Cir. 2002); and then citing 
Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that a § 3604(b) violation “may be 
established not only by proof of discriminatory intent, but also by a showing of significant discriminatory 
effect”)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
1248 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:1227 
in this context, to allege intentional acts of discrimination on the part of the 
landlords.168 
In dissent, Judge Livingston issued a comprehensive attack on the 
majority’s opinion. She began by analyzing the text of both § 3604(b) and 
§ 3617 and concluded that they both require a plaintiff to allege “discrimination 
or related conduct by the defendant and would not appear to impose an ongoing 
duty to prevent discrimination by others.”169 Indeed, Judge Livingston’s 
interpretation of the relevant FHA provisions is much more narrow than the 
majority’s. For § 3604(b), she reads the statute’s protections to extend only to 
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges “of the rental arrangement,” 
which she grants has some, but not expansive, post-acquisition reach.170 
Regarding § 3617, Judge Livingston concluded that its language prohibiting 
“intimidation, coercion, and other inappropriate intermeddling in others’ 
enjoyment of rights protected by § 3604 is a particularly unlikely place to look 
for a duty to intervene to address one tenant’s harassment by another.”171 Finally, 
from a textual perspective, Judge Livingston disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of these provisions as not requiring discriminatory intent on the 
defendant’s part. Noting that § 3604(b) covers discriminatory conduct “because 
of” and § 3617 reaches prohibited conduct “on account of” the plaintiff’s 
membership in a protected class, both require discriminatory intent on the part 
of the defendant.172 
Turning to precedent, Judge Livingston cited the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
in Wetzel as the only case remotely supporting the majority’s expansive 
interpretation of the FHA. She acknowledged that Wetzel read the FHA as 
“creat[ing] liability against a landlord that has actual notice of tenant-on-tenant 
harassment based on a protected status, yet chooses not to take any reasonable 
steps within its control to stop that harassment.”173 But Judge Livingston pointed 
to the fact that Wetzel allegedly violated the applicable “Tenant’s Agreement,” 
 
 168. Id. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court also noted that the facts alleged by Francis could support 
a claim of intentional discrimination against him by the housing providers. In particular, Francis alleged that the 
housing providers had investigated and intervened when allegations of harassment unrelated to race were 
brought to their attention. See id. At the time of the decision, it was unresolved whether those allegations would 
be proven true at trial. Id. 
 169. Id. at 127 (Livingston, J., dissenting). As a preliminary matter, Judge Livingston questioned the broad 
post-acquisition scope of the FHA adopted by the majority, noting Judge Posner’s observation that the FHA 
“contains no hint in either its language or its legislative history of a concern with anything but access to housing.” 
Id. at 128 (quoting Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 
2004)). 
 170. Id. at 129; see also Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
§ 3604(b)’s prohibition on discrimination in “the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith” 
refers to the sale or rental of the housing, rather than to the dwelling itself). 
 171. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 130 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 131. The dissent also took issue with the majority’s conclusion that Francis had adequately pled 
discriminatory intent by asserting that the defendants had investigated and remedied allegations of non-racial 
tenant-on-tenant harassment. Id. 
 173. Id. at 133 (quoting Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2018)). 
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which guaranteed various services to the plaintiff.174 By failing to stop Wetzel’s 
harassment at the hands of other tenants, and by barring Wetzel from common 
areas that she was entitled to access under that agreement, Judge Livingston 
agreed that the plaintiff “may have sufficiently alleged that the landlord 
‘discriminate[d] . . . in the provision of services or facilities’ that had been 
guaranteed in the rental agreement.”175 
The dissent then targeted the majority’s reliance on an analogy to Title VII 
as supporting its broad reading of the FHA.176 While acknowledging that Title 
VII imposes liability on a negligent employer in the context of employee-on-
employee harassment, even in the absence of any discriminatory intent on the 
part of the employer, Judge Livingston said that the majority’s importation of a 
Title VII theory of liability directly into the FHA was a first.177 The dissent 
warned against “reflexively superimpos[ing]” Title VII law onto the FHA178 
given the “significantly different environments” of the workplace and home.179 
Such reliance is particularly inappropriate because there are major and well-
known legal distinctions between the relationship of employer to employee and 
landlord to tenant.180 Two of those important differences are the central role of 
agency law in guiding judicial interpretation and setting of liability standards 
under Title VII and the dramatically greater control that employers exercise over 
the work environment as compared to landlords in the housing setting.181 
The dissent then noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“traditional ‘tort-related . . . liability rules’” should be considered when 
interpreting the FHA.182 Under such rules, courts have traditionally recognized 
that a mere power to evict—which all landlords have—does not create a 
“reasonable opportunity or effective means to control” a third party.183 The 
dissent appeared to concede that the fact pattern of Wetzel—where the landlord 
provided daily meals and maintenance of community spaces—might suggest a 
heightened level of control justifying potential landlord liability for failing to 
stop tenant-on-tenant harassment.184 In contrast, Judge Livingston saw in 
 
 174. Id. at 133–34 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 134 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)). 
 176. See id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 134–35. 
 179. Id. at 135 (quoting Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for 
Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,055 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to 
be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100)). The distinction between home and workplace, and whether that distinction 
has relevance in the Title VII and Title VIII harassment analyses, is discussed infra notes 141–142 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 135 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)). 
 182. Id. at 137 (omission in original) (quoting Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Torre v. Paul A. Burke Constr., Inc., 661 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div. 1997)). 
 184. Id. at 138.  
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Francis the typical level of landlord control that would not justify the 
recognition of similar liability.185 
Finally, the dissent turned to HUD’s 2016 regulation, which the majority 
used to reinforce its decision. Judge Livingston rejected any deference to the 
rule, finding its language inconsistent with the FHA’s text, as well as previously 
existing precedent establishing the scope of the FHA.186 The dissent also found 
that it relied on a “flawed analogy to Title VII.”187  
b. Francis II 
While the Second Circuit’s opinions issued March 4, 2019, provided an 
interesting clash of perspectives on the scope of the FHA, they were withdrawn 
in April of 2019.188 The Second Circuit’s new decision and opinions in Francis 
II were issued in December of 2019.189 This new decision also reversed the trial 
court’s conclusions.190 In addition, both the majority and dissent issued revised 
opinions.191 Despite this confusion, the Francis II opinions—in particular, a 
comparison of them to the Francis I opinions—provide an intriguing glimpse 
into statutory interpretation and judicial struggles to define the contours of the 
FHA. 
Judge Lohier’s Francis II opinion for the majority was similar to his earlier 
opinion in Francis I with several important and inter-related changes. First, he 
excised from his earlier opinion all references to the 2016 HUD rule explicitly 
articulating FHA liability for landlords in certain cases of tenant-on-tenant 
harassment, which had figured so prominently in his earlier reasoning.192 
Francis II also omitted all reliance on Title VII as an analogy to support such 
liability in the FHA context.193 Instead, in its revised opinion, the court rests its 
broad interpretation of the FHA’s scope on the statutory language in § 3604(b) 
and § 3617,194 aided by an expansive congressional intent to “root out 
discrimination in housing.”195 The only reference to HUD regulations remaining 
in the revised opinion notes that HUD rules have, for thirty years, suggested a 
post-acquisition scope for the statute beyond constructive eviction.196 Similarly, 
 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 138–40. 
 187. Id. at 140. 
 188. Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 920 F.3d 168, 169 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 189. Francis II, 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 
15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021).  
 190. Id. at 373. 
 191. Id. at 373 (majority opinion), 381 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 192. See id. at 394 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (observing that “[t]he majority has now abandoned the HUD 
Rule, which it relegates to a footnote”). 
 193. See id. at 391 (recognizing that the revised majority opinion suggests the applicability of a Title VII 
analogy “only under a ‘cf.’ signal”). 
 194. Id. at 378–79 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 378 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)). 
 196. Id. (citing regulations, for example, that prohibit under the FHA “[f]ailing or delaying maintenance or 
repairs of sale or rental dwellings because of race” in 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (alteration in original)). 
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Title VII survives in Francis II only in a string citation to support its conclusion 
that the use of “privileges” in § 3604(b) suggests congressional intent to trigger 
continuing post-acquisition protection of tenants under the FHA.197 There is no 
other reference to Title VII in the majority opinion, much less any express 
attempt to draw an analogy to Title VII for the purposes of establishing a 
continuing obligation on the part of landlords to stop unlawful tenant-on-tenant 
harassment. 
Second, the majority in Francis II eliminated all serious discussion of 
whether intentional discrimination is a required element of a FHA violation.198 
In doing so, the court removed a key component of its earlier opinion, in which 
it analogized to Title VII where courts “have not required a showing of direct 
intentional discrimination by the employer before imposing liability” if the 
employer has “actual or constructive knowledge of the non-supervisory 
employee’s harassment” and fails to act reasonably to stop that harassment.199 
Using this Title VII analogy, Francis I concluded that, to the extent the trial 
court required Francis to allege that defendants intentionally discriminated in 
order to state a viable FHA claim, it committed error.200 In stark contrast to its 
earlier opinion, the majority in Francis II simply states, “we assume without 
deciding that intentional discrimination is an element of an FHA violation.”201 
Third, and consistent with its new assumption that a viable FHA claim must 
include an allegation of intentional discrimination, the court clarified its 
reasoning and the facts on which it relied. In Francis II, the court made clear 
that the plaintiff properly stated a claim under the FHA for intentional 
discrimination when it alleged that the defendants chose not to take reasonable 
steps within their control to address tenant-on-tenant harassment based on race, 
but they had taken such steps when confronted with claims of non-race related 
tenant-on-tenant harassment in the past.202 While this point was also made in 
Francis I,203 it appeared secondary behind a broader reading of the FHA’s reach. 
But in the absence of any arguments by the majority that the FHA may be 
violated when the defendants lacked discriminatory intent, either based on HUD 
rules or analogy to Title VII, this case transforms into one that presents a 
relatively common FHA question, albeit in an unusual context: Did the housing 
provider intentionally discriminate against one tenant by ignoring his complaints 
 
 197. Id. at 376. In particular, the court cited to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which includes similar “terms, 
conditions, or privileges” language as § 3604(b) and has been interpreted as prohibiting both pre- and post-hiring 
discrimination and harassment. Id. at 375–76.  
 198. See id. at 379. 
 199. Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 124 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and superseded by 944 F.3d 
370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 
(2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021).  
 200. Id. 
 201. Francis II, 944 F.3d at 379. 
 202. Id. at 378–79.  
 203. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 124–25. 
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about race-based harassment when it investigated and addressed claims of other 
types of harassment brought by other tenants?204  
The dissent appeared to see this argument as a smoke screen, not explicitly 
pled by the plaintiff, that hid the true question being resolved in the revised 
opinion: Whether the FHA should be interpreted as not just prohibiting landlords 
from discriminating, themselves, but also requiring them to intervene in and stop 
the harassing conduct of other tenants.205 Furthermore, it appeared clear that 
Judge Livingston saw the majority’s change of tactics in Francis II as tacit 
acknowledgement that the court’s earlier reliance on both Title VII and the HUD 
rule was misguided.206 
c. HUD Regulations 
As discussed earlier, HUD’s 2016 regulations specifically articulating 
landlord liability in certain cases of third-party harassment, figured prominently 
in both the Wetzel and Francis lawsuits. While it is far from obvious that 
recognizing landlord liability in this context requires the existence of an 
applicable HUD rule,207 the fact that HUD has promulgated such a rule deserves 
attention in this analysis. This Subpart provides context for the rule and 
discusses both its terms and HUD’s rationale.  
HUD’s regulation of harassment in the housing context dates back to at 
least 1989, following amendments to the FHA expanding its scope to include 
protection based on a person’s disability and familial status.208 Those rules did 
not explicitly prohibit harassment in the housing context or provide standards 
for evaluating such claims. However, the rules did include language clearly 
covering post-acquisition harassment, providing the following example of 
unlawful discrimination: “Denying or limiting services or facilities in 
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling, because a person failed or 
refused to provide sexual favors.”209  
 
 204. Francis II, 944 F.3d at 379–80. But the FHA clearly prohibits intentional discrimination by landlords 
based on race. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2018).  
 205. Francis II, 944 F.3d at 384 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority bases its opinion “on 
a theory not even relied upon” by Francis and noting that “Francis himself does not argue that the . . . Defendants 
are liable because they acted with racial animus”). 
 206. Id. at 391 (“[T]he analogy to Title VII only highlights the glaring problems inherent in [Francis I’s] 
theory of FHA liability—problems that explain why this analogy, so prominent in the majority’s earlier effort, 
has now been relegated to a ‘cf.’ citation.” (citation omitted)). 
 207. See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text; Francis II, 944 F.3d at 394 (Livingston, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority has now abandoned the HUD Rule, which it relegates to a footnote . . . .”). 
 208. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3232–01 (Jan. 23, 
1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 14, 100, 103–06, 109–10, 115, 121). 
 209. Id. at 3232–01, 3285. Those rules made clear that the FHA has a significant post-acquisition scope. For 
example, they stated that it would be unlawful to “[t]hreaten, intimidate[e,] or interfer[e] with persons in their 
enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of 
such persons.” Id. at 3232–01, 3291. In addition, those rules prohibited “[f]ailing or delaying maintenance or 
repairs of sale or rental dwellings because of race.” See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (2020).  
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In 2015, HUD proposed regulations that would serve as the foundation for 
the rules that ultimately went into force in 2016.210 The 2015 proposals sought 
to formalize standards for investigating and adjudicating harassment claims 
under the FHA,211 particularly where the discriminatory housing practices were 
undertaken by individuals other than the landlord.212 
HUD saw a need for these rules given the courts’ continuing pattern in 
FHA cases of relying on doctrine developed in the Title VII employment 
context.213 In its view, the Title VII standards “are not always the most suitable 
for assessing claims of harassment in housing discrimination cases given the 
differences between harassment in the workplace and harassment in or around 
one’s home.”214 This is especially true in hostile environment cases, which 
should be evaluated based on the overall context of the alleged harassment, or 
the “totality of the circumstances.”215 One central way in which housing 
harassment cases are different is the locus of harassment: the home. 
HUD noted that courts have recognized a heightened right to privacy and 
freedom from intrusive speech in the home setting, citing to Supreme Court 
language referencing the “sanctity of the home” and the “value” of the home as 
the “last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,” making the state’s interest 
in protecting the home environment “of the highest order in a free and civilized 
society.”216 As a result, harassment that occurs in the home setting is particularly 
 
 210. See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing 
Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 63,720, 63,722 (Oct. 21, 2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. 
pt. 100). In 2000, HUD proposed rules governing sexual harassment in housing, which never went into effect. 
See Fair Housing Act Regulations Amendments Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. 
67,666, 67,666–01 (Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); see also Quid Pro Quo and Hostile 
Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 80 
Fed. Reg. at 63,722 (indicating that HUD “[n]ever issued final regulations” following the November 13, 2000 
proposed rules relating to sexual harassment). Justifying its proposed regulations, HUD explained that courts 
had relied on Title VII rules in the housing context, but that important differences between the two settings 
necessitated separate FHA rules. See Fair Housing Act Regulations Amendments Standards Governing Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,666. These proposed rules clearly provided for their potential liability 
resulting from certain cases of third-party harassment. See id. at 67,668. In particular, the rules stated that where 
a person or his agents “knew or should have known of the third party’s conduct and did not take immediate and 
appropriate corrective action and had a duty to do so,” liability would exist for that person. Id. According to 
HUD’s interpretative notes, such a duty could arise from “leases, contracts, condominium by-laws[,] and local 
ordinances.” Id. (citing Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass’n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU, 
1997 WL 1877201, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997)). In addition, HUD expressly listed two “[e]xamples of third 
parties” whose harassment a housing provider might be responsible for: tenants and independent contractors. Id. 
at 67,667.  
 211. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 80 Fed. Reg. at 63,720. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 63,724 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). Others have written about the 
sanctity of the home and the particularly harmful nature of harassment that occurs there. See, e.g., Michelle 
Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 17 (1998); Lindemyer, 
supra note 63; Maggie E. Reed, Linda L. Collinsworth & Louise F. Fitzgerald, There’s No Place Like Home: 
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harmful for at least two reasons. First, it occurs in an environment that is 
intended to be a safe haven from the stress of the outside world.  Second, there 
is often no place to escape when harassment occurs in the home.217 Because of 
these differences, HUD concluded that conduct violating the FHA under the 
totality of the circumstances, given the unique nature of the home, might not 
violate Title VII.218 
HUD’s proposed regulation created direct liability for a person who 
“[f]ail[s] to fulfill a duty to take prompt action to correct and end a 
discriminatory housing practice by a third-party, where the person knew or 
should have known of the discriminatory conduct.”219 This proposed rule, 
however, went on to explain how and where a housing provider’s duty to end a 
discriminatory housing practice might arise: “from an obligation to the 
aggrieved person created by contract or lease (including bylaws or other rules of 
a homeowners association, condominium[,] or cooperative), or by federal, 
state[,] or local law.”220 This proposed language suggested, curiously, that a 
housing provider might incur FHA liability for third-party harassment only 
where the housing provider had, and breached, a separate duty to correct that 
kind of a discriminatory housing practice.221 
In response to its 2015 proposed rules, HUD received sixty-three public 
comments from a range of stakeholders, including public housing agencies, 
nonprofit organizations, private housing providers, and civil rights groups.222 Its 
final housing harassment rules, published on September 14, 2016, were largely 
consistent with its proposed rules but did include several modifications in 
response to public comments.223  
Most notably, HUD reworked proposed section 100.7(a)(1)(iii), relating to 
a housing provider’s direct liability for discrimination by third parties. Its draft 
had included needlessly confusing language about the source of the duty 
requiring the housing provider to correct a discriminatory housing practice.224 
 
Sexual Harassment of Low Income Women in Housing, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 439 (2005); Kate Sablosky 
Elenglod, Structural Subjugation: Theorizing Racialized Sexual Harassment in Housing, 27 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 227 (2016); George, supra note 63. 
 217. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 80 Fed. Reg. at 63,724 (citing Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2010) 
for the proposition that the home is “a place where [one is] entitled to feel safe and secure and need not flee”). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 63,730; 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(iii) (2020).  
 220.  Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 80 Fed. Reg. at 63,730.  
 221. Recognizing that its draft rules “may have caused some confusion,” HUD redrafted this provision in 
the final rules “to avoid confusing the substantive obligation to comply with the Fair Housing Act with the 
standard of liability for discriminatory third-party conduct.” See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment 
Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 
63,054, 63,056, 63,067 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 222. Id. at 63,057.  
 223. For example, HUD clarified that a single incident of harassment could constitute either quid pro quo 
or hostile housing environment if sufficiently severe. See id. at 63,065. 
 224. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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The revised and final section 100.7(a)(1)(iii) is more direct: liability exists where 
a person fails to “take prompt action to correct and end a discriminatory housing 
practice by a third-party, where the person knew or should have known” of the 
conduct and “had the power to correct it.”225 That power “depends upon the 
extent of control or any other legal responsibility the person may have with 
respect to the conduct of the third-party.”226 With this revision, HUD tried to 
make clear that a housing provider’s duty to end third-party discrimination flows 
directly from the FHA, not any applicable lease or set of homeowner association 
bylaws.227  
HUD’s responses to public comments also addressed the “knew or should 
have known” standard for triggering liability established in section 
100.7(a)(1)(iii).228 HUD received a number of public comments voicing various 
concerns with this standard. Commenters complained that the “should have 
known” language injected confusion into the liability scheme, raising 
uncertainty about exactly what knowledge triggers liability. For example, is the 
housing provider required to know that the harassment violates the FHA, or is it 
sufficient to know that “the harasser took some action toward the victim”?229 
Other commenters raised concerns about the amount of knowledge that might 
trigger liability, asking for reduced liability for housing providers that have 
limited knowledge, possibly including owners who live out of state.230 
HUD rejected these concerns and retained its “should have known” 
standard in section 100.7(a)(1)(iii), describing this language as “well established 
in civil rights and tort law.”231 HUD explained that a housing provider “should 
have known” about third-party harassment when it has “knowledge from which 
a reasonable person would conclude that the harassment was occurring.”232 Such 
knowledge can come from the victim, another resident, or a friend of the 
victim.233 Although this standard may appear to incentivize housing providers 
to gather little information about the personal interactions of its tenants, HUD 
encouraged housing providers to “create safe, welcoming, and responsive 
housing environments” by providing regular training to staff, developing 
policies that prohibit discrimination, and quickly resolving complaints “once 
 
 225. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,056, 63,074. 
 226. Id. at 63,056. 
 227. Id. at 63,067. 
 228. Id. at 63,066. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003), and other U.S. Supreme Court decisions for the 
proposition that housing actions essentially sound in tort). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 63,066–67 (first citing Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003); and then 
citing Bradley v. Carydale Enters., 707 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Va. 1989)). 
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sufficient information exists that would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that harassment was occurring.”234 
One of the most substantive critiques of HUD’s draft rules raised by public 
comment went to the core of the mental state required for liability. Some 
commenters raised the concern that courts have traditionally interpreted 
§ 3604(b) and § 3617 as requiring proof of discriminatory intent.235 However, 
both the draft and final version of section 100.7(a)(1)(iii) impose merely a 
negligence standard—knew or should have known. Commenters voiced concern 
that this standard was inconsistent with existing case law, including a recent 
Ohio Supreme Court decision in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Akron 
Metropolitan Housing Authority.236 
HUD disagreed that the FHA requires a housing provider’s failure to 
remedy unlawful harassment committed by a third party to be motivated by 
discriminatory animus.237 The only federal decision holding to the contrary was, 
at the time, the trial court in Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., which has since 
been vacated.238 HUD reiterated that its proposed section 100.7(a)(1)(iii), with 
its “should have known” structure, imposes a “negligence standard of 
liability.”239 Although that standard does not require discriminatory intent to 
prove a violation, it also is “far from strict liability.”240 Because this provision 
imposes liability when a landlord negligently fails to take corrective action when 
the landlord provider knows or should have known about the third-party 
harassment and has the power to end it, its final rules are consistent with Title 
VII jurisprudence and “appropriately serve[] the [FHA’s] parallel 
antidiscrimination objectives in the housing context.”241 
III.  EXPLORING THE ANALOGY TO TITLE VII 
The recent decisions in Wetzel and Francis, combined with HUD’s 2016 
rulemaking, make two things clear. First, there is no consensus at the present 
time about whether landlords have an obligation under the FHA to remediate 
cases of tenant-on-tenant harassment and, if they do, what the justification is for 
reading in that legal duty. Second, the soundness and strength of the Title VII 
 
 234. Id. at 63,067. 
 235. Id. at 63,068. 
 236. Id.; see Ohio C.R. Comm’n v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 892 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Ohio 2008) (refusing 
to find liability under a state fair housing law for a landlord who failed remedy housing harassment committed 
by one tenant against another when no intentional discrimination on by the landlord was alleged). 
 237. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,068. 
 238. See Francis II, 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, 
No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). Although the Second Circuit vacated the trial 
court’s dismissal, it did not explicitly address the relevant state of mind requirement and assumed for the 
purposes of analysis that the FHA requires proof of intentional discrimination. See id. at 379.  
 239. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,068. 
 240. Id. at 63,069. 
 241. Id. 
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analogy is critical in resolving this question. The relevant language of the FHA 
is general in nature and, especially when combined with broad congressional 
intent, can reasonably be stretched to establish such a FHA duty. But the reach 
of the FHA is not unlimited, which poses the question of whether its language 
should be read to stretch that far.  
With such uncertainty about the precise meaning of the FHA’s text, courts 
will naturally look to Title VII for guidance, as they have repeatedly when 
struggling to identify the FHA’s scope in other settings.242 Title VII case law 
and regulations are clear: employers are obligated to act reasonably to attempt 
to stop the creation of a hostile work environment that they know or should have 
known about.243 If the normal Title VII analogy holds in this case, landlords will 
face a similar duty, as roughly articulated in HUD’s 2016 rulemaking. But courts 
have resisted the Title VII analogy when appropriate in other contexts244 and 
have already counseled against a reflexive adoption of Title VII standards in this 
context.245 
Nevertheless, given the various similarities of the two statutes, the default 
position should be that they are read in harmony with one another absent strong 
reasons to deviate in interpretation. As one federal court has noted, it would be 
“strange indeed if the nearly identical language of the FHA did not also impose 
liability for post-acquisition discrimination on landlords” in at least certain 
situations.246 As a result, the following Subparts, first, provide context for the 
Title VII analogy and then, second, look at the primary arguments that have been 
made to reject the Title VII analogy when interpreting whether the FHA requires 
landlords to stop tenant-on-tenant harassment. These arguments require 
unpacking the justifications for parallel employer liability in the workplace 
setting, as well as analysis of policy justifications that have been raised. As 
discussed more fully below, no sound legal or policy justification exists to reject 
the Title VII analogy in this new area of FHA law.  
 
 242. Short, supra note 17, at 240 (citing to cases using the Title VII analogy in FHA litigation involving 
“whether to recognize discriminatory effects, how to approach mixed motive cases, and when burden shifting 
should be implemented in the process of evaluating discriminatory intent” (footnotes omitted)). 
 243. See infra Part III.B (collecting cases involving employer liability under Title VII in cases in which 
employees were harassed by supervisory employees, non-supervisory employees, customers, patients, 
independent contractors, and anonymous parties). 
 244. See, e.g., Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 135 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (citing Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974), where the Court “reject[ed] reasoning by analogy to Title VII in interpreting [the 
FHA]”), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 
F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 245. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrews Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(recognizing in the context of a suit involving potential landlord liability under the FHA for tenant-on-tenant 
harassment that “there are salient differences between Title VII and the FHA”). 
 246. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 118. 
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A. TITLE VII’S PROHIBITION ON HARASSMENT OF EMPLOYEES 
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.247 “Employer” is defined broadly to include, 
among others, agents of employers.248 The statute casts a broad net and prohibits 
a wide range of discriminatory employment practices. One of the core 
prohibitions in Title VII is contained in section 703(a)(1): an employer engages 
in an unlawful employment practice if it refuses to hire, or it discharges, or it 
“discriminate[s] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”249 As discussed earlier, this statutory 
provision contains language very similar to § 3604(b) of the FHA.250 
Various courts have held unlawful discrimination under this section of Title 
VII to include harassment based on a listed status.251 In Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, a bank employee alleged an ongoing pattern of sexual harassment 
committed by her supervisor.252 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first 
time held that Title VII prohibits the creation of a hostile work environment 
through the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language in 
section 703(a)(1), even in the absence of specific financial harm to the 
plaintiff.253 In recognizing this expansive scope of Title VII, the Court stated 
that the language in section 703(a)(1) was intended to “‘strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment.”254 To be 
actionable under Meritor, however, the prohibited harassment must be 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive255 ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.’”256 The Court cited 
 
 247. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 248. Id. § 2000e(b). 
 249. Id. § 2000e-2(a).  
 250. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 251. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
 252. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59–61 (1986). 
 253. Id. at 64. At the time of the Court’s decision, guidelines issued by the EEOC stated that sexual 
harassment, regardless of whether it is connected to any economic benefit, constituted conduct prohibited by 
Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). The Court in Meritor cited to those guidelines and stated that they 
“fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII.” Meritor, 477 U.S. 
at 65. 
 254. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 
n.13 (1978)). 
 255. Although Meritor did not provide much guidance on what makes harassment severe or pervasive, the 
Court returned to this concept in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). In that decision, the Court 
explained that there are both subjective and objective components to this inquiry: the harassment must be serious 
enough that a reasonable person would consider it “hostile or abusive,” and the victim must find it abusive. Id. 
at 21. In proving this element, plaintiffs “must clear a high bar . . . . Workplaces are not always harmonious 
locales, and even incidents that would objectively give rise to bruised or wounded feelings will not on that 
account satisfy the severe or pervasive standard.” See E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th 
Cir. 2008). 
 256. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 
(11th Cir. 1982)). The Court later explained in a subsequent case that while quid pro quo harassment clearly 
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with approval language from an earlier federal decision concluding that Title 
VII protects against “a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or 
racial discrimination” or “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy 
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group 
workers.”257  
Recognizing that Title VII prohibits the creation and maintenance of a 
hostile work environment provides just the first step in our analysis. The next 
step is the most significant: Under what circumstances can and should an 
employer be legally responsible for that hostile work environment? In other 
words, under the final prong of the traditional hostile work environment liability 
framework, what is the basis for imputing liability to an employer for the 
existence of a hostile work environment?258  
B. AGENCY IS MISSING IN THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP 
One of the primary justifications for abandoning the Title VII analogy in 
this new FHA context is that employer liability for employee-on-employee 
harassment is built on an agency relationship, which is absent in the landlord-
tenant setting. As one court noted, “The agency principles that govern employer-
employee liability have no parallel in the context of landlord-tenant disputes.”259 
This difference alone, according to another court, “urges caution in endorsing 
[the] full-scale incorporation [into the FHA] of the precise claim recognized in 
the employment context.”260 This caution is especially warranted, the court 
contended, because the Supreme Court “consistently looks to ‘agency principles 
for guidance’ in setting Title VII liability standards.”261 It is certainly true that 
tenants are not usually agents of their landlords. As a result, if employer liability 
 
violated Title VII, it was “[l]ess obvious” whether an atmosphere of harassment would. Burlington Indus., Inc. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). The Meritor Court’s requirement that the hostile employment environment 
be severe or pervasive to trigger liability was a way to ensure that harassment that rose to the level of a 
constructive change to the terms or conditions of employment would be treated under Title VII like an actual 
change to the terms or conditions of employment in a quid pro quo setting. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 257. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (citing Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).  
 258. See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2001) (articulating the 
requirements to prove a hostile work environment under Title VII: plaintiff must show that she (1) suffered 
unwelcome harassment; (2) based on a protected characteristic; (3) the harassment was so severe and pervasive 
that it altered the conditions of employment and created a hostile work environment; and (4) there must be some 
basis for imputing liability to the employer). 
 259. Francis v. King’s Park Manor, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Ohio C.R. 
Comm’n v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 892 N.E.2d 415, 419 (Ohio 2008)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded, 917 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 
2019), vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded, 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 
(2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). The district court in Francis also opined that previous courts had required intentional 
discrimination on the part of the landlord to make out a case for hostile housing environment because of the lack 
of an agency relationship in that context. See id. at 429.  
 260. Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 135 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), 
and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 
15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 261. Id. (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72). 
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for the maintenance of a hostile workplace is predicated on the existence of an 
agency relationship between the employer and the harasser, there may be a 
compelling reason to adopt a different rule in the housing setting. Answering 
that question requires analysis of the underlying justifications for employer 
liability in the workplace context. 
In Meritor, when the Supreme Court first recognized a Title VII claim for 
hostile work environment, it did so in the context of harassment perpetrated by 
a supervisor.262 So one important question the Court addressed was under what 
circumstances should an employer be liable for the hostile environment created 
by a supervisor?263 The trial court concluded that because the bank “was without 
notice” of the supervisor’s harassment, the bank could not be held liable for that 
conduct.264 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that strict liability applies where a supervisor sexually harasses an 
employee: “We think employers must answer for sexual harassment of any 
subordinate by any supervising superior.”265 As a result, the bank should be 
liable for the discriminatory acts “even though the employer neither knew nor 
reasonably could have known of the alleged misconduct.”266 Because the Court 
in Meritor did not have a fully developed factual record, it chose not to establish 
a “definitive rule” on employer liability in the context of supervisor 
harassment.267 However, the Court agreed with the position of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Congress “wanted courts to 
look to agency principles for guidance in this area.”268 Specifically, the Court 
focused on Congress’s inclusion of “agent of an employer” in Title VII’s 
definition of “employer” as signaling “an intent to place some limits on the acts 
of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.”269 
For that reason, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that employers 
are automatically liable under all circumstances for sexual harassment 
committed by supervisors.270 
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court, with a more 
complete factual record, directly addressed whether an employer would be 
vicariously liable when a supervisor created a hostile work environment.271 In 
that case, a salesperson at Burlington Industries refused a series of unwanted and 
increasingly threatening sexual advances from her supervisor, although she did 
 
 262. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59–60. 
 263. Id. at 69–73. 
 264. Id. at 69. 
 265. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 266. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. 
 267. Id. at 72. 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. 
 271. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). In Ellerth, the factual record indicated 
that the supervisor made explicit threats to change a subordinate’s terms or conditions or employment in the 
course of sexual harassment, but he failed to actually do so. See id. 
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not suffer any tangible, adverse employment consequences.272 Building on 
Meritor, the Ellerth Court stated that Congress’s inclusion of “agent” in the Title 
VII definition of “employer” necessitated the Court’s creation of “a uniform and 
predictable standard” under federal agency law to answer this question.273 
Looking first to the Restatement (Second) of Agency for guidance, the Court 
identified a core principle of agency law: “A master is subject to liability for the 
torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment.”274 After tracing through the history of how “scope of 
employment” has been interpreted in the context of intentional torts such as 
sexual harassment, the Court ultimately concluded that, as a general rule, “sexual 
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.”275 
Nevertheless, the Court also recognized that scope of employment is not 
the only potential basis for establishing agency liability for a supervisor’s 
harassment of a subordinate. Specifically, the court identified additional 
situations under section 219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency in which 
a master may be subject to the torts of its servants operating outside the scope of 
employment. The most important of these situations for present purposes is 
“when the master is negligent or reckless.”276 According to the Court, an 
employer would be considered negligent in this context “if it knew or should 
have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”277 In the Court’s words, 
“[n]egligence sets a minimum standard for employer liability under Title 
VII.”278 
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court again analyzed 
employer liability under Title VII for a supervisor’s creation of a hostile work 
environment.279 In evaluating plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment, the Court 
recognized that “few definite rules” have been created by federal courts to 
determine when an employer should be liable for a hostile work environment 
created by a supervisor.280 Up to that point, courts that had found employers 
liable for such discrimination relied on various theories, including actual 
 
 272. Id. at 747–49. 
 273. Id. at 755. 
 274. Id. at 755–56 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (AM. L. INST. 1957)). 
 275. Id. at 757. 
 276. Id. at 758. The Court also discussed section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement, which imposes liability when 
the servant has apparent authority or is “aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d). The Court in Ellerth concluded that no issue of apparent 
authority arose in that case because the supervisor exercised actual authority. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. For the 
exception of aiding in accomplishing, the Court concluded that a supervisor’s tangible employment action 
against a subordinate constitutes an act of the employer itself. Id. at 762–63. In situations short of a tangible 
employment action, the Court declined to offer explicit guidelines for establishing an employer’s liability, noting 
that this area “is a developing feature of agency law.” Id. at 763. 
 277. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. 
 278. Id.  
 279. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998). 
 280. Id. at 788. The Court recognized that many Title VII cases have focused on whether the underlying 
conduct was severe or pervasive, rather than assessing employer liability. Id. at 788–89. 
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knowledge on the part of the employer, the senior management status of the 
harassers, or an employer’s failure to act after being notified of the 
harassment.281 In those cases, according to the Court, “the combined knowledge 
and inaction may be seen as demonstrable negligence, or as the employer’s 
adoption of the offending conduct and its results.”282  
The Court then turned to a discussion of the various cases that have held 
sexual harassment by a supervisor to be outside the scope of employment, 
thereby absolving the employer of liability.283 In such decisions, courts have 
treated cases of unwelcome touching as being motivated by the supervisor’s 
individual desires, rather than serving some purpose of the employer.284 For 
these courts, the creation of a hostile work environment has been similar to the 
“classic ‘frolic and detour,’” for which an employer has no vicarious liability.285 
But the Court recognized that these no-employer liability cases stand in contrast 
to a significant body of decisions in which courts, in non-Title VII cases, have 
construed the scope of employment broadly enough to find an employer’s 
vicarious liability for intentional torts that had little or no connection to the 
supervisor’s scope of employment.286 Some of those cases have even involved 
instances of sexual assault, where courts have found the offending conduct to be 
foreseeable or where it was generally concluded that the employer should bear 
the cost of doing business.287 While the Faragher Court declined the opportunity 
to fully rationalize the Title VII sexual assault cases with those from outside the 
Title VII context, it did offer some general perspective. 
Specifically, the Court said that the “proper analysis” was not mechanically 
tied to any Restatement (Second) of Agency sections or factors related to 
common law agency doctrine. Instead, the “ultimate question” is “whether or 
not it is just that the loss resulting from the servant’s acts should be considered 
as one of the normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is 
employed.”288 
1. Harassment by Non-Supervisors 
The above analysis governs cases where a supervisor creates a hostile work 
environment. In those situations, courts rely heavily on agency principles 
interwoven with negligence standards. But an employer may be liable under 
Title VII when a hostile work environment is created by other individuals, 
including non-supervisory employees, third parties, and even anonymous 
 
 281. Id. at 789.  
 282. Id. In contrast, when a supervisor commits quid pro quo harassment, the employer’s liability under 
agency theory is clearer. See id. at 790–91. 
 283. Id. at 793–96. 
 284. Id. at 794. 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id. at 794–96. 
 287. Id. at 795–96 (citing various cases). 
 288. Id. at 797 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1957)). 
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harassers.289 These contexts more closely align with the FHA scenario of a 
landlord’s potential liability for tenant-on-tenant harassment. Although 
employers are not strictly liable in these situations,290 the liability they do face 
is based on principles unrelated to agency law.291 
As a starting point, an employer’s liability in the case of a non-supervisor’s 
creation of a hostile work environment is direct, not derivative: it results from 
the employer’s own failure to act appropriately, rather than from the harassing 
conduct, itself.292 By failing to take appropriate corrective action after adequate 
notice, the employer may be seen to have “adopt[ed] the offending conduct and 
its results, quite as if they had been authorized as the employer’s policy.”293 In 
this way, the employer’s inadequate response adds injury to the victim, separate 
and apart from the underlying harassing conduct.294 The adequate notice piece 
of this statement is important, as employers cannot face Title VII liability if they 
are unaware of the harassing conduct.295 
Returning to the traditional framework for assessing a claim for a hostile 
work environment, the central question is under what circumstances the creation 
and maintenance of a hostile work environment by a non-supervisor can be 
imputed to an employer.296 Federal courts have been consistent and clear with 
the answer: Liability exists in such situations only where the employer “knew or 
should have known about the harassment and failed to take effective action to 
stop it.”297 As a result, knowledge of the harassing environment can be imputed 
to the employer “if a reasonable person, intent on complying with Title VII, 
would have known about the harassment.”298 Once that “known or should have 
 
 289. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The environment in which 
an employee works can be rendered offensive in an equal degree by the acts of supervisors, coworkers, or even 
strangers to the workplace.” (citations omitted)); see also Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 135 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., 
dissenting) (“Though less common, an employer can sometimes be liable for failing to address a hostile work 
environment that is created by a non-agent (a non-employee).”), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and 
superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-
1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 290. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
 291. See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing 
Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,068–69 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100) (critiquing the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Akron 
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 892 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio 2008) as misconstruing Title VII cases law as requiring 
that an agency relationship exist between an employer and the harasser). 
 292. See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 293. Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998)). 
 294. See Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 811 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the employer’s 
failure to respond properly “exposes the employer not to liability for what occurred before the employer was put 
on notice of the harassment, but for the harm that the employer inflicted on the plaintiff as a result of its 
inappropriate response”). 
 295. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 296. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 297. E.E.O.C. v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 669 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 
335 F.3d 325, 333 (4th Cir. 2003), and Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 2006)); E.E.O.C. v. 
Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 298. Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 334. 
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known” standard is satisfied, the employer is required to undertake remedial 
action that is “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.”299  
All of the cases cited in the prior three paragraphs involve situations of 
non-supervisory employee-on-employee harassment that was imputed to the 
employer. None of those decisions hinged on agency law; they all imposed a 
negligence “known or should have known” standard to trigger employer 
liability. But courts have imposed employer liability under Title VII for 
harassment in an even wider range of fact patterns, including where employees 
have been harassed by third parties not employed by the company.  
In Galdamez v. Potter, the plaintiff, who worked for the United States 
Postal Service, alleged harassment on the job at the hands of both fellow 
employees and members of the public based on her race and national origin.300 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that refused a jury 
instruction on the employer’s duty “to investigate and remedy actionable 
harassment by customers and community members.”301 The Ninth Circuit 
specifically stated that when an employer fails to investigate or remedy 
harassing conduct by a third party targeting one of its employees, the employer 
“ratifies or condones the conduct.”302 This theory of Title VII liability is 
“grounded in negligence and ratification rather than intentional 
discrimination.”303 Importantly, as a result, the plaintiff in Galdamez was not 
required to prove discriminatory animus on the part of her employer to make out 
a Title VII claim that the employer failed to take reasonable steps to stop the 
harassment.304 Other courts have agreed and have consistently found that an 
employer can face Title VII liability for failing to take reasonable steps to stop 
harassment of an employee by a third-party non-employee if the employer knew 
or should have known of the harassment.305 These holdings are consistent with 
guidance issued by the EEOC, which makes employers responsible for acts of 
non-employees against employees where the employer “knows or should have 
 
 299. Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1131–32 (4th Cir. 1995); accord Mikels v. City of 
Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 329 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 300. Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 301. Id. at 1022. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id.; see Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998)); Fahnbulleh v. GFZ Realty, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 360, 385 (D. Md. 2011). 
 304. Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1022; see also Guthrie v. Baker, 583 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (W.D. Pa. 2008) 
(“This theory of liability is grounded not in the harassing act itself . . . but rather in the employer’s ‘negligence 
and ratification’ of the harassment through its failure to take appropriate and reasonable responsive action.” 
(quoting Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 305. See, e.g., Mongelli v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476 (D. Del. 
2007) (collecting cases holding this); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1068 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding 
an employer liable for harassing acts against employee committed by customer); Johnson-Harris v. AmQuip 
Cranes Rental, LLC, No. CIV.A. 14-767, 2015 WL 4113542, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2015); Armstead v. Exec. 
Cleaning & Supply, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-2452, 2014 WL 4659935, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2014); Pryor v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective 
action.”306 
In this context, courts have recognized Title VII employer liability where 
employees face unlawful harassment committed by various third parties in 
different locations, including by patients of a state-run mental health hospital 
run by the employer,307 customers visiting a ready-mix concrete seller,308 an 
independent contractor physician who harassed nurses at a medical facility,309 
participants in a residential program for developmentally disabled individuals,310 
and a sales representative who visited the employer’s work site.311 Courts have 
also imposed Title VII liability on employers when the harassment took place 
anonymously against an employee, such that the perpetrator could not be 
identified.312 Title VII liability can even exist where an employee is unlawfully 
harassed by a non-employee at a location other than the normal work site.313 
2. Relevance to the Housing Setting 
While agency law figures prominently in determining whether the creation 
of a hostile work environment should be imputed to an employer under Title 
VII, it does so in specific fact patterns involving harassment by supervisory 
employees. That makes sense. An employer should be directly liable for his own 
harassment of employees, and agency law helps define the contours of his 
liability for the harassing conduct of any supervisors he employs. And because 
many workplace harassment lawsuits involve conduct perpetrated by 
supervisors, many reported decisions on Title VII are filled with references to 
both common law agency principles and specific provisions of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the agency 
 
 306. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2020) (“An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, 
with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or 
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate 
corrective action.”). This clear negligence standard language does not, obviously, impose strict liability on 
employers for the harassing conduct of third parties that target employees. See Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 
255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 307. See Turnbull, 255 F.3d at 1244.  
 308. See Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 309. See Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 310. See Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1110 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the lower court’s 
decision that, essentially, “permits a residential care provider . . . to tell its employees that they assume the risk 
of working with developmentally disabled individuals and that they have no right to expect a safe working 
environment”). 
 311. See Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 422–23 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 312. See, e.g., Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 2015) (“An employer is not 
subject to a lesser standard simply because an anonymous actor is responsible for the offensive conduct.”); 
E.E.O.C. v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 669, 672 (4th Cir. 2011). However, the fact that the harassment took 
place anonymously should factor into the court’s overall assessment of whether the employer responded 
reasonably once it knew or should have known of the harassment. See Pryor, 791 F.3d at 498. 
 313. See Guthrie v. Baker, 583 F. Supp. 2d 668, 680 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding that although the case of 
harassment of an employee “by a non-employee at a non-workplace” was a case of first impression, the 
distinction from the normal scenario of workplace harassment “is one without a difference”). 
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relationship underpins all of Title VII employer liability for workplace 
harassment or that the absence of an agency relationship in the landlord-tenant 
context undercuts the Title VII analogy. 
As discussed above, a sizable body of case law has carved out employer 
liability under Title VII for harassment by non-supervisors, including ordinary 
employees and even third parties.314 That law ignores agency principles, as it 
should, and focuses, instead, on whether the employer acted reasonably under 
the circumstances when unlawful harassment existed.315 The reasoning of these 
courts in the Title VII context appears directly applicable to the housing setting, 
as well. The underlying intentional harassment in both settings violates 
applicable statutory provisions of Title VII and the FHA. Neither the employer 
nor the landlord should face liability for that underlying harassment; however, 
both have the power to take steps to stop the harassment when they know or 
should have known of its existence.316 By failing to act reasonably under the 
circumstances, their inaction violates the underlying negligence standard 
undergirding both statutes.317 The fact that Title VII liability in this context has 
been explicitly “grounded in negligence and ratification, rather than intentional 
discrimination”318 helps ease its analogous application in the housing setting. 
Landlords should be subject to FHA liability in the case of tenant-on-tenant 
harassment in the absence of any discriminatory animus on their part. Although 
the FHA requires intentional discrimination to violate its terms, the tenant-on-
tenant harassment setting involves such intentional discrimination at the hands 
of other tenants. The landlord, like the employer, has a duty to act reasonably in 
response.  
C. LANDLORD LACKS SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER HARASSING TENANTS 
The second major justification for not recognizing FHA liability for 
landlords in the case of tenant-on-tenant harassment is tied to the perceived lack 
of control that landlords have over harassing tenants. In her dissent in Francis I, 
for example, Judge Livingston argued that in Title VII cases, “the extent of the 
employer’s control” over the harassing third party is “critical in deducing 
whether that employer is property held accountable” under Title VII.319 
 
 314. See, e.g., Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005); Mongelli v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476 (D. Del. 2007).  
 315. See supra notes 289–299 and accompanying text. 
 316. There are obvious differences between the powers of employers and landlords in these situations. See 
infra Part III.C. 
 317. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that housing actions are essentially tort actions. See Meyer v. 
Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); see also Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 865 
(7th Cir. 2018) (explaining that the defendants’ liability, if any, would be direct for “standing pat as Wetzel 
reported the barrage of harassment”). 
 318. See Galdamez, 415 F.3d at 1022; see also supra notes 302–303 and accompanying text. 
 319. Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 135 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), 
and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 
15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
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According to Judge Livingston, employers have significantly more control over 
the workplace environment and their employees than landlords do in the housing 
setting.320 This control, she argued, extends to the ability to monitor for 
harassing behavior and take steps to end any such conduct.321 The landlord’s 
lack of sufficient control over the harassing tenant, she appears to maintain, 
means that we cannot or should not impute that conduct to the landlord under 
the FHA as a threshold matter. But Judge Livingston’s argument about control 
misses several important points. 
First, there is no strong evidence that the “control” concept she refers to in 
Title VII was ever intended to operate as a necessary predicate to evaluating an 
employer’s potential liability for a hostile workplace. That concept traces to one 
sentence in the EEOC’s regulation on employer liability for sexual harassment 
by non-employees in the workplace, referenced earlier.322 It states that in 
evaluating such claims, the EEOC “will consider the extent of the employer’s 
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with 
respect to the conduct of such non-employees.”323 The EEOC’s language does 
not condition employer liability on a certain level of control over the third party, 
nor does it provide any guidance about what a sufficient degree of control might 
be or how one might measure it. It simply says that the agency will consider the 
employer’s control over the harassing non-employee when applying the 
regulation.  
This EEOC regulation went into force in 1980,324 and the Author is not 
aware of any reported appellate decision that bases dismissal of a Title VII claim 
on an employer’s lack of sufficient control over the non-employee harasser.325 
Weighed against that lack of precedent are various cases that have proceeded 
against employers under Title VII for the harassing conduct not just of non-
supervisory employees, but third parties over whom the employer has little, if 
any, control.326 For example, in Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of Title VII claims by an employee who 
 
 320. Id. at 135–36. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See supra note 306 and accompanying text; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2020) (“In reviewing these cases 
the Commission will consider the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility which the 
employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.”). 
 323. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e). 
 324. Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended; Adoption 
of Final Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1604). 
 325. In the primary case cited by Judge Livingston about the importance of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e), the court 
concluded that the alleged harassers—members of a college football team—were under the control of the head 
football coach. Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 
122 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an operator of a group home “clearly controlled the 
environment” in which a harassing resident lived, reversing the district court’s granting of summary judgment 
that was based on the employer’s lack of control over the offending resident).  
 326. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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alleged sexual harassment perpetrated by customers of her employer.327 The 
court on appeal concluded that there were factual issues that required resolution 
at the trial level about whether the employer had notice of the harassing conduct 
and took adequate steps to remedy it.328 In another example, the plaintiff in 
Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp. alleged that her employer violated Title VII by 
allowing sexual and racial harassment at the hands of a sales representative who 
regularly visited her company.329 The Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of 
summary judgment and concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to respond 
adequately.330  
Employer liability under Title VII in these and other cases of non-employee 
harassment has been consistently evaluated using two elements: First, did the 
employer know, or should it have known, of the harassing conduct? And second, 
did the employer take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the 
harassment?331 The concept of the employer’s “control” over the harassing non-
employee is not a predicate consideration that can insulate an employer from 
potential Title VII liability outside the actual elements of this legal test. As the 
Seventh Circuit explained it, “[t]he employer’s responsibility is to provide its 
employees with nondiscriminatory working conditions. The genesis of 
inequality matters not; what does matter is how the employer handles the 
problem.”332 Similarly, while landlords may have more or less control over a 
particular third party creating a hostile housing environment, there is no 
compelling reason to treat the question of control as a threshold matter that must 
be satisfied before turning to the traditional two elements above. 
Second, and relatedly, an employer’s—or landlord’s—control over a 
harassing third party is directly relevant to, and can be fully considered in, both 
of the traditional elements used to evaluate hostile environment liability. In the 
first element, an employer faces potential Title VII liability for a non-employee’s 
harassment only if it knows or should have known of the harassment.333 Such 
notice may come, for example, from actual complaints filed by the victim with 
the employer or its agent or by the pervasiveness of the hostility within the 
working environment.334 In the employment context, there is often little dispute 
about whether the employer has notice of alleged harassment, as the victim often 
 
 327. Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 422–23 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 330. Id. at 423–24. 
 331. See, e.g., id. at 423. 
 332. Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005). Citing that language for support, one 
federal court has ruled that an employer may be liable under Title VII for sexual harassment of an employee by 
a non-employee who allegedly committed the offending acts outside of work. Guthrie v. Baker, 583 F. Supp. 2d 
668, 680 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
 333. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998). 
 334. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2001). 
April 2021] TENANT-ON-TENANT HARASSMENT 1269 
complains directly to management or files a grievance.335 At the very least, the 
employer is likely to be charged with constructive knowledge of harassment that 
permeates the working environment.336  
A landlord in a situation involving tenant-on-tenant harassment may not 
receive notice so easily. If the victim does not report the harassment directly to 
the landlord or its agents, the landlord may not reasonably become aware of the 
offending conduct if it occurs in relative isolation, such as in the perpetrator’s 
apartment or in the common laundry room. Depending on the facts of the 
particular case, the landlord may have a compelling argument that it lacked both 
actual and constructive notice of the offending harassment because, essentially, 
it lacked control over the harassing party. 
The concept of control is even more relevant when analyzing the second 
element of the test: once the employer has notice of discriminatory behavior, did 
it take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment?337 
While remedial action that stops harassment will be considered effective as a 
matter of law, courts recognize that offending behavior may recur even in the 
face of reasonable and adequate efforts by employers to stop it.338 This 
reasonableness inquiry “looks not to whether offensive behavior actually ceased 
but to whether the ‘remedial and preventative action was reasonably calculated 
to end the harassment.’”339 In the Title VII context, there is no “exhaustive list” 
of remedial measures satisfying this element; instead, the core of the inquiry is 
whether the employer’s response was “reasonable under the circumstances.”340 
However, courts have considered a number of employer actions in this context, 
including promptly investigating complaints; counseling or disciplining 
offending employees; and whether the employer’s actions actually stopped the 
harassment.341 Courts have also looked specifically at whether the employer 
created an anti-harassment policy and an adequate complaint procedure.342 
Beyond the specific steps taken by the employer, courts also look to the 
timeliness of those steps in evaluating the adequacy of the employer’s 
response.343 
 
 335. See, e.g., Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 336. See, e.g., Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the 
employer received notice of the harassment by virtue of prostitution rumors and inappropriate bulletin board 
postings). 
 337. See, e.g., Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 423 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 338. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 670 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 339. Turnbull, 255 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 676 (10th Cir. 
1998)). This is particularly true in inherently dangerous working environments, such as prisons, where the focus 
is on whether the employer took reasonable steps to create a safe workplace. Id.  
 340. See Adler, 144 F.3d at 675–78. 
 341. See Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d at 669.  
 342. See, e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 187 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 343. See, e.g., Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding that an employer’s remedial 
actions are adequate “as a matter of law, where management undertook an investigation of the employee’s 
complaint within a day after being notified of the harassment, [and] spoke to the alleged harasser about the 
allegations”). 
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The control that employers have over the workplace is certainly greater in 
many ways than the control that landlords have over most housing settings.344 
As a result, employers usually have broader powers to investigate and remedy 
harassment than landlords do.345 But the underlying test is negligence, and there 
is no requirement in the law that landlords must have an “analogue” for every 
investigative and remedial tool at the disposal of employers.346 The obligation 
on landlords—and employers—is to act reasonably by using the powers 
available to them to investigate and then attempt remediation of unlawful 
harassment. Exactly what steps must be taken by a landlord in any particular 
case will be fact-dependent, as the Second Circuit recognized in Francis,347 and 
may hinge on the language of relevant leases or community bylaws. But 
landlords could presumably be expected to always respond promptly to written 
complaints from a tenant about harassment by meeting with the tenant, asking 
relevant questions, and creating an incident report that documents all pertinent 
details. Landlords might also be expected to interview any witnesses to the 
harassment, as well as the tenant alleged to have perpetrated the abuse. And if a 
landlord concludes that unlawful harassment has taken place, such harassment 
could be addressed, depending on its severity, with warnings, the threat of 
eviction, or even actual eviction.348 Once again, the underlying test is one of 
negligence, and the question is whether the landlord acted reasonably given the 
tools at its disposal, not whether it had available exactly the same tools as an 
employer. One possible outcome using this test in an extreme case is that a 
“landlord may not have enough control over its tenants to be held liable for 
failing to intervene.”349 But the fact that landlords may escape liability in some 
extreme cases does not abrogate their duty to act reasonably in light of available 
investigative and remedial tools. 
Notably, HUD’s 2016 regulation explicating landlord liability for third-
party harassment, which mirrors employers’ liability under Title VII, contains 
similar “control” language. After requiring that landlords take “prompt action” 
to correct and end discriminatory housing practices that they know or should 
 
 344. Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 135–36 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d 
Cir.), and superseded by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, 
No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
 345. But not always. See supra notes 325–326 and accompanying text (discussing cases where employers 
are subject to Title VII for harassment by third parties they have little, if any, control over). 
 346. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 136 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (noting that the remedial steps that employers 
are often required to take in the context of employee-on-employee harassment “have no analogue in the housing 
setting”). Such steps might include beginning a prompt and comprehensive investigation, requiring sexual 
harassment training of all employees, or separating the alleged harasser from the victim. Id. 
 347. Id. at 122 (majority opinion). 
 348. Id. at 122–23; Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory 
Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,071 (Sept. 14, 2016) (to be codified at 
24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (describing a wide range of corrective measures potentially available to landlords, including 
“verbal and written warnings; enforcing lease provisions to move, evict, or otherwise sanction tenants who harass 
or permit guests to harass; issuing no-trespass orders against guests; or reporting conduct to the police”). 
 349. Francis I, 917 F.3d at 122. 
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have known of, HUD qualifies that obligation: “The power to take prompt action 
to correct and end a discriminatory housing practice by a third-party depends 
upon the extent of the person’s control or any other legal responsibility the 
person may have with respect to the conduct of such third-party.”350 In its 
response to public comments, HUD makes clear that this language simply 
clarifies the underlying negligence standard that is in play. When confronted 
with tenant harassment perpetrated by a third party, landlords are required to 
undertake reasonable steps to stop that harassment to the extent that the 
offending party is within the landlord’s control.351 The degree of control a 
landlord has over a particular offending tenant figures directly into the 
remediation the landlord should be expected to pursue.352 
D. PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS 
It seems clear that the usual Title VII analogy does not break down in this 
new area of FHA law because of any reasonable concern about agency principles 
or a lack of landlord control over an offending tenant. One final reason to 
consider abandoning the analogy in this context is based on general public policy 
concerns. Some of these were expressed in public comments to HUD’s draft 
rulemaking on landlord liability for third-party harassment. For example, 
commenters expressed confusion about exactly what knowledge is required to 
trigger a landlord’s duty to investigate and remedy: Must the landlord know that 
unlawful harassment under the FHA has occurred, or is it sufficient to know 
simply that some rude conduct has taken place between tenants? Will landlords 
who are not physically present at their housing units face greater burdens under 
this test? Will landlords face liability if a victim of harassment does not come 
forward to report that abuse? What happens if harassment in the housing setting 
occurs online, away from the reasonable awareness of the landlord? And will 
this duty flood courts with FHA lawsuits over the resolution of common 
neighborhood disputes?353 
There are at least two broad responses to these concerns. First, to the extent 
they are reasonable, these questions, or some variation of them, also arise in the 
Title VII context. For example, employers may also face uncertainty about 
whether rude behavior in the office crosses the line to unlawful harassment.354 
 
 350. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(iii) (2020). 
 351. See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing 
Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,068 (explaining that the rule “merely requires the 
[housing provider] to take whatever actions it legally can take to end the harassing conduct”). 
 352. Once again, there is a parallel duty on employers to act reasonably in the Title VII context. See supra 
Part III.B. 
 353. See Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing 
Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,066–67. The Second Circuit in Francis I also addressed 
briefly the defendants’ “parade of horribles” that would result from recognition of this legal duty on landlords. 
Francis I, 917 F.3d at 121. 
 354. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (stating that “simple teasing” does not violate 
Title VII, which should not be construed as a “general civility code”). 
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And they may have concern about the degree to which they must surveil the 
work site, particularly if they are absent frequently. But this body of Title VII 
law is well-established, and employers appear generally capable of navigating 
these questions. There is nothing inherent to the housing setting that suggests 
that landlords will have a harder time of that. 
Second, the reason that these and similar questions do not unduly torment 
employers or bog down our legal system is likely found in the elements of the 
controlling legal test. In the housing setting, the test triggers a landlord duty only 
when the landlord knew or should have known about the discriminatory 
conduct.355 As HUD made clear in its 2016 response to comments, the “knew or 
should have known” standard is “well-established in civil rights and tort law.”356 
It is satisfied when a landlord has “knowledge from which a reasonable person 
would conclude that the harassment was occurring.”357 If the victim does not tell 
the landlord, or if the harassment occurs online or outside the control of the 
landlord, or if the landlord is not physically present on the premises to observe 
a hostile housing environment, the landlord may have no effective notice and, 
therefore, no legal duty to investigate or intervene. Neither HUD’s rules nor the 
circuit courts in Wetzel and Francis impose any duty on landlords to be 
physically present to receive complaints or undertake active surveillance of the 
premises.358 Landlords must simply act reasonably under the circumstances.359 
Employers under Title VII face a similar obligation. 
There is also a public policy thread to some of the critiques of this rule 
embodied in Judge Livingston’s dissent in Francis I. In the context of 
identifying the various ways in which employers have more control over the 
workplace and employees than landlords have in the housing setting, Judge 
Livingston lists investigative and remedial tools that landlords do not have 
available to them, including the ability to order anti-harassment training or to 
transfer an offending employee.360 The strong suggestion is that because 
landlords lack those tools, they should not have a duty to investigate and 
remediate tenant-on-tenant harassment.  
 
 355. 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(iii). 
 356. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,066. 
 357. Id. 
 358. See id. at 63,068 (stating that the rule “does not add any new forms of liability under [the FHA] or 
create obligations that do not otherwise exist”). 
 359. Id. at 63,067. 
 360. Francis I, 917 F.3d 109, 136–37 (2d Cir.) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (concluding that “just as landlords 
do not have the same capacity as employers to monitor their tenants, neither do they ordinarily have similar tools 
at their disposal to investigate and remediate misconduct”), withdrawn, 920 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.), and superseded 
by 944 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2019), reh’g granted, 949 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2020), and vacated, No. 15-1823-CV, 2021 
WL 1137441 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2021). 
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Once again, landlords may not ordinarily have the same powers in these 
areas as employers do. But it is unclear, even if this is true,361 why that fact 
should absolve landlords of the duty to act reasonably. Recognizing this FHA 
cause of action is not a silver bullet, and it does not impose strict liability on 
landlords. It is easily conceivable that landlords in some cases may not have 
actual or constructive knowledge of particular tenant-on-tenant harassment. Or 
they may acquire such knowledge and then run out of effective tools to 
investigate or stop the harassment.362 But they do have a range of options 
available to them for fact-gathering, remediation, and general education of the 
community. And in pursuit of the FHA’s broad purpose to eliminate unlawful 
discrimination in housing, they should be required to utilize them when they 
have notice of unlawful harassment. The alternative—allowing landlords to sit 
idly by in the face of severe or pervasive harassment under their watch—is 
contrary to the spirit and letter of the FHA and inconsistent with parallel 
expectations of employers under Title VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial and appellate court decisions in Wetzel and Francis reflect a 
profound disagreement about the meaning of the FHA’s text and its application 
to post-acquisition claims, generally, and landlord liability for tenant-on-tenant 
harassment, in particular. Given that lack of consensus, courts are right to look 
to the analogous workplace context under Title VII. In that setting, applying 
nearly identical statutory language, courts have routinely recognized employer 
liability for failing to take reasonable remedial steps when they knew or should 
have known about a hostile work environment, regardless of how that was 
created. A similar rule should apply in the housing setting. HUD promulgated 
such a regulation in 2016, but federal courts have expressed concern about 
adopting that approach given largely unspecified differences between the 
workplace and housing. As discussed above, an analysis of the justifications for 
employer liability in Title VII hostile environment cases makes clear that 
parallel reasoning applies with equal force in the housing context. Furthermore, 
no sound policy exists in this context to deviate from courts’ normal reliance on 
the Title VII analogy when interpreting the scope of the FHA. Landlords have a 
variety of investigative and remedial tools available to them and should be 
required to reasonably deploy them when provided actual or constructive notice 
of a hostile housing environment. Adoption of this negligence-based standard 
will help protect vulnerable tenants from the pernicious effects of harassment 
 
 361. Once again, this argument assumes that employment harassment triggering an employer duty always 
occurs at the work site and always by co-workers, all under the employers’ control. Case law proves that to be 
untrue. See supra Part III.B1. 
 362. Landlords do have the ultimate power to evict a harassing tenant if justified. See Francis I, 917 F.3d at 
122; Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,071.  
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while recognizing reasonable and fair limits on landlords’ abilities to investigate 
and remedy tenant-on-tenant harassment.  
 
